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The Internet is a source of information, communication and entertainment,

which makes it impossible for us to imagine a world without being connected. However, there has been a tremendous growth of crimes targeting any form of digital medium. The main objective of this dissertation is to develop and empirically
evaluate computational optimization models for investigating digital crime and computer/network intrusion.
The first research problem considered in this dissertation relates to the Crime
Scene Investigation (CSI) in digital forensics. First, a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model is proposed to allocate optimal investigation times for evidence,
thereby maximizing the overall effectiveness of a forensic investigation procedure.
Second, since the proposed general problems are NP-hard, two heuristic algorithms
for the sequential digital forensic model with a single investigator and one heuristic algorithm for the sequential digital forensic model with multiple investigators are
proposed and empirically evaluated to solve the described general problems.
The second research problem addressed in this dissertation involves the investigation of alarms generated by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with limited
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research is what I’m doing
when I don’t know what I’m doing.
—Wernher von Braun
1.1

Motivation
Computer and network security is a universally growing area of importance as

more information technologies and applications are being automated and more vital,
sensitive and massive amount of information are being stored and handled by computer systems. Particularly, attacks on national computer and network infrastructure
present an increasingly prevalent problem. In early days, many attackers wanted to
prove that they could break into these systems; however, the trend in recent years is
shifting towards intrusions motivated by financial and electronic fraud [1]. With the
advancement of the Internet and related technologies, one can compromise or attack
systems, web sites or networks using readily available automated intrusion tools that
specifically target widely known and exposed vulnerabilities [2, 3].
Figure 1.1 illustrates that the level of sophistication of attacks being perpetrated is continuously increasing while, at the same time, the level of technical
knowledge needed to execute these attacks is declining [2]. A recent security analysis
1

Figure 1.1: Attack sophistication versus intruder knowledge [2]

by Symantec [4] reports that hundreds of vulnerabilities and new threats were discovered during the first six months of 2013, following an increase in many threats since
2012. The research in this dissertation is motivated by a need to develop suitable
techniques to mitigate, or at least reduce the effect of these vulnerabilities.

1.2

Network Security and Digital Crime
The term computer or network security means “protection of information from

unauthorized disclosure, modification and destruction [5].”The three basic properties
that define security are as follows:

2

1. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to authorized users while preventing access by or disclosure to unauthorized ones. In
simple terms, it ensures that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized recipients. Authentication methods, such as user-IDs and passwords, that
uniquely identify system users and control access to system resources underpin
the goal of confidentiality.
2. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of information resources. It includes
the concept of data integrity which ensures that data have not been changed
inappropriately, whether by accident or deliberately through malicious activity.
It also includes source integrity which ensures that the data actually came from
the person or entity that you think it did, rather than an imposter.
3. Availability refers to the usability of information resources, as required by an
authorized user. An information system that is not available when you need it
is almost as bad as none at all.
It is critical to remember that appropriate and adequate levels of confidentiality,
integrity and availability depend on the context and often vary from application to
application.
Advancements in information technology have widely helped to expand cyber
space and have, in general, facilitated a majority of businesses and societies in their
increasing reliance on digital technology and inter-networked systems. As a result of
this advancement, digital crime is now becoming one of the most significant challenges
facing law enforcement organizations. Digital or electronic crime can be defined as
3

“any criminal activity that involves a computer or network during the commission of
a crime [1].”Stealing information or gaining authorization electronically is the same
as gaining access to steal goods from a warehouse, for information is a commodity.
The primary difference is that the loss of information often goes unnoticed.
A major underlying difference between digital and physical crime is the influence of the digital or virtual medium; however, in some cases they relate to one
another [6, 7]. In the precise sense, digital medium may obstruct one of the three
main tenets of information security that forms the CIA triangle--Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability--or it may create an imbalance among them. This imbalance
of security in the CIA triangle serves as a gateway for three avenues of digital crime:
Computer, Network and Web. Throughout this dissertation, digital crime is used in
reference to all three of these mediums. Having impaired the CIA triangle, an attacker
would be able to successfully penetrate a computer or network to gain authorization
and eventually access to sensitive information. Sensitive information is stolen almost
daily from both government and private sector networks, undermining our confidence
in the very information that, these systems were intended to convey [8].
The history and evolution of cyber crime is much shorter than traditional
crimes. The term “cyber crime”became popular in early 1960s, when mainframe
computers were introduced. The crimes during the mainframe era were mostly insider
crimes because the computers were not inter-linked with one another. This scenario
was changed drastically with the invention of the Internet [9]. The increasing use of
inter-networked computers transformed computer crime to what is known as the real
“cyber or digital crime.”The first major instance of digital crime was reported in the
4

year 2000, when a mass-mailed computer virus affected nearly 45 million computer
users worldwide [10]. With the invention of the Internet and Cloud computing, people
have started to rely on digital mediums, more and more. In consequence, this trend
has opened a gateway for using computers and networks as both tools and targets for
committing cyber crimes, thereby creating new challenges for investigators due to the
speed, anonymity, and fleeting nature of evidence associated with such crimes [11].
Based on the roles played by a computer or network, digital crime can be
primarily classified into two main categories [11, 12]:
1. A computer or network used as a subject: In general, these cases relate to
cyber crimes committed by a person utilizing computer or network tools and
software. Further, computers or networks can be used as a passive storage
medium or communication tool for performing cyber crimes. Spamming and
copyright violations facilitated through peer-to-peer networks are good examples of a computer or network being used as a subject of an attack.
2. A computer or network used as an object: These cases refer to cyber crimes in
which computers or networks become the targets. This form of crime generally
involves acquiring sensitive information that is stored on a computer or network
to possibly compromise and hence acquiring authentication and authorization to
control the target system. In some cases, the integrity of the data stored on the
target system is altered. Some interesting examples in which computers or networks are used as objects of an attack are unauthorized authentication/access,
Denial of Service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle attacks.

5

Figure 1.2: Computer or network as a subject or object of a digital crime [12]

Thus, a computer or network can be used as a subject or an object for conducting an act of digital crime, as shown in Figure 1.2. The criminal can use his/her
computer or network to steal sensitive information from the publicly available Internet or from any targeted remote server or client system. On another hand, the
same remote computer or client server can offer richer target/object of attack. In the
former case, an illegitimate or malicious query is sent to a targeted or open system
while in the latter case, sensitive information is stolen from the remote server or client
system and bypassed or sent to the attacker.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the categorization of well-known attacks under which a
computer or network is being used as a subject or object/target of an attack. Among
these attacks, identity based (ID) attack or theft is noted as a top complaint category
in consumer fraud [13, 14].

6

Figure 1.3: Categorization of popular attacks

1.3

Purpose of the Research
The purpose of research reported in this dissertation is to develop suitable

techniques to solve two specific problem related to digital crime.
(1) The first problem involves the development and solution of analytical models to
increase the overall effectiveness of the digital forensic investigation procedures in
apprehending the suspect and establishing the perpetration of a crime in a court
of law.
(2) The second problem involves the development and solution of an optimization
model to ensure that the right set of alarms is being sent for investigation and
that, the firm’s total cost and resource use is kept at a minimal level.
Each of the problem is briefly discussed below.

7

1.3.1

Crime Scene Investigation in Digital Forensics
Digital forensics is a branch of science relating to the application of scientific

techniques for the investigation and re-construction of a crime scene involving digital
evidence. It is defined as
“The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources
for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events
found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown
to be disruptive to planned operations [15].”
Digital forensic investigation is the procedure of examining a crime scene once a fraud
or a crime is suspected to have been committed.
Digital forensics is an independent field that originated in the early 2000s when
computer- and network-related crime started burgeoning with the increased use of the
Internet [16]. A form of digital forensics has been around for nearly as long as computers have been invented; however, forensic investigation capabilities have witnessed
significant advancements in recent years as digital forensic processes have matured
and the demand for effective investigative procedures have become more prevalent [1].
According to a recent survey conducted by the Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) Computer Crime group, about 46% of the respondents were affected by at least one major
form of digital crime [17]. Also, the reasonable rate of overall effectiveness of digital
forensics and the incident response procedures in organizations was reported to be
8

Comparison of overall effectiveness of digital forensics and incident
response

2.6%
20.2%

Not at all effective
23.0%
Marginally effective

Reasonably effective

Very effective

54.2%

Figure 1.4: Overall effectiveness of digital forensics and incident response capability
[18]

around 55% [18]. However, the rates for marginal and very effective procedures were
noted to be around 23% and 20%, respectively, as shown in Figure 1.4.
Digital forensic investigation involving cyber crimes requires extensive research
and highly specialized skills, followed by a series of well coordinated investigation
phases and analysis techniques [19]. During the first phase of the investigation, a
digital forensic crime scene expert performs a preliminary analysis to gather all initial information from the scene. The expert then works on image acquisition and
evidence recovery. This process involves creating evidence copies from master data,

9

and extracting details from all images and documents acquired during the search procedure of the crime scene. Next, this evidence undergoes analysis and examination
procedures in a digital forensic laboratory. Finally, the laboratory investigators prepare a detailed final report along with relevant evidence justification to be presented
in a court of law.
The laboratory investigators, often referred to as “first-time responders,”are
vital in solving a digital crime. In today’s world, this group consists of people who
have backgrounds in law and science. The primary responsibilities of an investigation
team are to collect, examine or investigate and reconstruct digital crimes. The roles
and functions of an investigative team comprise three elements that make up the
computer security triad shown in Figure 1.5. This team manages investigations by
conducting the required forensic analysis of evidence related to a digital incident or
crime.
Investigators often need to co-ordinate with law enforcement personnel throughout the duration of a case and may need to explain their evidence-based reports.
Investigators are also sometimes called to testify in a court of law, where they act as
the leading authority for evidence collection and the conclusions drawn as a result of
the investigation. They must be prepared to explain the nature of the evidence with
respect to the case and justify their conclusions based on the investigation.
The rate of growth of digital crimes has remained steady and, in some cases,
has increased. Correspondingly, the number of investigations that demand accurate
results within shorter time limits has experienced significant growth. In order to meet
this demand, ongoing research and development is required to create viable models
10

Figure 1.5: Information security triad [14]

for effective forensic investigation processes. The current state of digital forensic investigation is plagued by issues of achieving overall effectiveness. In this research,
mathematical models for improving the overall effectiveness of a digital forensic investigation procedure are developed.

1.3.2

Investigation of Intrusion Detection System Alarms
Network security and defense has become a critical and challenging concern

since the inter-networking of computers. Networked computers facilitate a growing
majority of communication around the world, but they also increase vulnerability to
digital attacks. Access to the Internet also plays a vital role in deciding the security
levels of the inter-networked computer systems and making the development of the
best mechanisms and tools to protect information systems a necessity.
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Intrusions are caused by attackers who attempt to gain unauthorized access
to information for which they have limited or no privileges. IDS has been identified
as a key tool available to network administrators that aids in protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information across computer or network security
systems. The main purpose of an IDS is to detect and issue alarm for events that may
potentially indicate that the security of the network has been compromised. The three
main tasks that constitute an IDS process are (1) monitoring and analyzing traffic;
(2) identifying abnormal activities; and (3) assessing severity and raising alarms.
IDS is a tool and not a stand-alone system or utility that has its own inbuilt ability to make decisions. However, it can effectively assist an administrator
or Information Security Operations Center1 (ISOC) staff in choosing the right set
of alarms to be investigated. Figure 1.6 shows the architectural representation of
an ISOC, whose main function is to continuously monitor applications in order to
identify a possible attack or intrusion and to estimate the threat level for business.
Hence, in real-time operational environments, the role of an investigator is
to process the output of an IDS and, in turn, detect and respond to attacks [20].
While these types of attacks are manageable in small networks, the problem becomes
intractable in the case of a large networked environment with multiple IDSs for monitoring. The unfortunate reality is that the existing research in IDS does not consider
the administrator’s role in selecting the right set of alarms for investigation. IDS
technology in its current state is comprised of a tool with sensors to monitor various
1

An information security operations center (ISOC) is a location at which enterprise information
systems (web sites, applications, databases, data centers and servers, networks, desktops and other
endpoints) are monitored, assessed, and defended.
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Figure 1.6: Architecture of ISOC [21]

types of attacks along with a set of heuristics developed by analysts or mathematicians to assist the tool-set in generating effective decisions [22]. These facts lead to
the central work undertaken in our research which aims to improve the investigation
process carried out by a single person or a group of administrators in choosing which
alarms need to be investigated and in what sequence they need to be investigated.

1.4

Novel Contributions
This dissertation research contributes to the field of digital forensic CSI and

IDS alarm investigation. Specifically, this dissertation contributes to the solutions of
digital forensic investigation and IDS alarm investigation as described below.
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• Time-Critical Forensic Cases. The current research models are not quite
effective in solving digital forensic cases, for which the results need to be justified and presented in a court of law within a specified time frame. Since there
is usually excessive amount of evidence collected from a digital crime scene,
the investigation process becomes complicated and time consuming. Further,
analyzing additional evidence that is not relevant to the nature of the case
might lead to the scope creep2 problem of digital forensics. Thus, the two major
research challenges for a digital forensic CSI are (1) to select the right set of
evidences and (2) to allocate time and available investigators for the selected
evidence. We accomplish this by developing a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) optimization model, which maximizes the overall effectiveness in
identifying the perpetrator of the crime in time-critical forensic cases.
• Sequential Examination of Evidence. Evidence analysis and investigation
in a laboratory can be classified into two basic scenarios: parallel and sequential.
In the parallel scenario, as soon as evidence is acquired at the crime scene, it
is sent to the laboratory for analysis. An immediate examination and analysis
of this evidence would help the team at the crime scene to determine what additional evidence needs to be collected for further analysis and what evidence
should be discarded as existing outside the scope of the investigation. Also,
there might be evidence that is not available until a particular time during the
investigation. This process continues until the deadline of the investigation is
2

Scope creep refers to the expansion of investigation procedure beyond the original assumptions
and description.
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reached. In the sequential scenario, on the other hand, the investigation in
laboratory will resume only after the acquisition of all evidences from the crime
scene. For the first time in the related literature and in this dissertation, we propose analytical models and heuristic algorithms to handle and solve the digital
evidence selection and resource allocation problem for the sequential evidence
analysis scenario. Further, we also establish the computational complexity of
these problems.
• Investigation of Passive IDS Alarms. The process of investigating alarms
raised by a passive IDS is important due to the following reasons:
(1) The process of investigation takes time, and if the suspicious traffic turns
out to be malicious, then damage to the firm increases with any delay
associated with the start and completion of the investigation process.
(2) The resources available for conducting such investigations are often limited.
(3) The time spent by administrators investigating IDS alarms is significantly
longer compared to the time that the IDS spends in monitoring and analyzing incoming events.
In this dissertation, we develop and present a MILP model that focuses on
investigating a set of alarms triggered by a passive IDS. Our proposed model
generates alarm sets that must be included or discarded for further analysis by
a security administrator. Our proposed heuristic algorithm provides an effective
and efficient methodology to minimize the total cost that a firm incurs in inves-
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tigating IDS alarms by enabling an optimal or near-optimal decision with which
to select the alarms that should be investigated as well as the best sequence for
such an investigation.

1.5

Dissertation Outline
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes

a novel modeling technique to maximize the effectiveness of a digital forensic CSI
procedure and suggests a method to allocate resources for evidence selected for investigation. Chapter 3 develops a mathematical model for minimizing the cost incurred
by a firm to investigate alarms raised by a passive IDS. In Chapter 4, we report
the results of experiments designed to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed heuristic algorithms for finding an optimal or near-optimal solution to the
general problems discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Finally, a summary of findings and
an overview of promising opportunities for future research are presented in Chapter
5.
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CHAPTER 2

EVIDENCE SELECTION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN
DIGITAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS

This chapter presents an important problem in digital forensics dealing with
the evidence selection and resource allocation in a crime scene investigation procedure.
We consider and present suitable techniques to solve time-critical forensic cases, in
which results have to be finalized within a specified time frame. The major challenges
with respect to digital forensic investigation addressed in this chapter are to (1)
determine the right set of evidences to be assigned to a single or multiple investigators
and (2) allocate appropriate investigation times for the selected evidence. Further,
we classify and describe sequential and parallel examination procedures for evidences
acquired from a digital crime scene.

2.1

Crime Scene Investigation
Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) is an important phase in digital forensics and

also a vital tool to fight against all types of digital crimes. CSI is very crucial as it
determines the quantity and quality of information available to a forensic investigator.
This piece of valuable information is often refereed to as “evidence”in CSI. Quantity
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refers to the maximum number of evidences acquired during the search process at the
crime scene whereas quality refers to the effectiveness of the evidence as relevant to
the nature of the case to justify that the suspect has committed crime in a court of
law. The basic theory for evidence in forensic science comes from the theory of Locard
exchange principle stated by Locard, which states that “Upon any contact between
two items, there will be an exchange of microscopic material [23, 24].”According to
this principle, no crime can occur without leaving a mark or evidence trace. CSI is
an important phase in digital forensics and also a vital tool to fight against all types
of digital crimes. The main objectives of a CSI can be summarized as follows:
• To acquire, analyze and document the computer, digital and related materials
in a forensically sound manner without interfering with the normal business
process.
• To gather evidence demonstrating possible criminal activity, which can prove
that the suspect has committed crime in a court of law.
• To facilitate a continuous investigation process while keeping the cost proportional to the cost of the incident crime.
• To identify and analyze the evidence in a short amount of time, estimate the
potential impact of the crime on the victim, and assess the intent and identity
of the perpetrator.
• To ensure the final evidences that are selected and investigated can have a
positive effect on the outcome of the entire case investigation.
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Evidences are the building blocks of any crime scene investigation procedure,
including those involving cyber crimes. In general terms, evidence can be stated as
“Information whether in the form of personal testimony, the language of documents,
or the production of material objects, that is produced during legal investigation, to
establish the fact or point in question [25].”Searching, analyzing and reporting these
evidences in a court of law are generally governed by established legal procedures
and regulations. Errors in any of these processes could lead to scope creep problem
imposing serious implications on the trial. Evidence is a vital mean for the court to
decide and prove whether the suspect is guilty or not in committing a crime. The
process of finding and investigating the right set of evidences, thus focusing on the
related areas of crime could significantly result in effective judgement and shortening
the trial period as well. The main classification of the nature of evidences are as
follows [26]:
1. Real or physical evidence, which consists of tangible objects that can be
seen and touched;
2. Circumstantial evidence, which is primarily based upon the personal experience, realities or observation from a crime scene that tends to support a
conclusion.
The basic properties of an evidence that makes it useful in a court of law are
described below [27]:
1. Admissibility: The fundamental property which defines the level of acceptance
of an evidence in a court of law. Failure to comply with proper legal rules and
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regulations while collecting and examining the evidences may well be equal to
discarding the evidences from being found and investigated.
2. Authenticity: During investigation, an investigator must be able to relate the
evidence to the nature of the crime to justify his/her results in a court of law.
3. Completeness: This property validates the suspect’s actions while proving the
victim’s innocence. It is not enough to provide justification from the suspect’s
side alone. Rather, collected and analyzed evidence should also be able to prove
that the victim was innocent during the course of the crime. For instance, in a
case of an identity (ID)-based attack, evidences can be found from associated
logs and time stamps which might show that both the victim and suspect have
logged in to access a banking web site at the same time. At this time of incidence, analyzed evidences must be able to identify the perpetrator of the crime,
while clearly distinguishing the innocence of the victim. These evidences are
often referred to as exculpatory evidence and plays an important role in a trial.
4. Reliability: At any point of time during the trial, evidence collection and investigation procedures must not throw any suspicion on the evidence’s authenticity
and veracity.
Due to the sophistication of the digital industry and cyber crime, factors such
as collection of hints, exploration of the method of attacks and identification of appropriate evidence closely related to the nature of the case need diligent attention.
An investigator needs to ensure proper details of the acquired evidences and its com-
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pliance with the chain of custody1 . The whole success of a case investigation depends
on presenting the acquired evidences in a manner acceptable in a court of law.
Thus, a digital crime scene investigation procedure collects and analyzes the
evidence necessary to demonstrate a potential hypothesis of a crime [1]. Also, this includes presentation or justification activities to illustrate the proven/refuted hypothesis. A key aspect of this hypothesis may include iterative investigation procedures
including on-site and laboratory analysis of evidences. A complex crime case may often expose many opportunities for error or misinterpretation and this kind of review
process helps to improve the overall effectiveness of the investigation. Most digital
forensic investigations carried out today do not have a scientific claim behind them.
The rapid rate of advancement of digital devices and technology has introduced the
difficulty for the current investigation procedures to stay updated. There needs to
be a scientific approach supporting the digital forensic investigation procedure. Figure 2.1 shows a symbolic flowchart representing such a scientific approach. The key
aspects of this approach are:
• To clearly interpret and define the nature of the case, which may include a
careful study of previous similar cases and related investigations.
• After gathering as much information as possible, a list of potential evidences as
related to the nature of the case is generated to conduct a search at the crime
scene, followed by the formulation of a hypothesis for investigation.
1

Chain of custody refers to the movement and location of physical evidence from the time it is
obtained until the time it is presented in court. Proof of a chain of custody is required when the
evidence that is sought to be introduced at trial is not unique or where the relevance of the evidence
depends on its analysis after seizure.
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Figure 2.1: Scientific approach for digital forensic investigation procedure

• The collected evidences are sent to the digital forensic laboratory for analysis
and result-based conclusions are drawn upon examination of evidences.
• The conclusions are tested and verified whether to accept or reject the hypothesis. In the case of acceptance, results are documented along with the analyzed
set of evidences to be presented in a court of law. Upon rejection, the hypothesis is modified with collection of additional evidences for further examination.
This process is repeated until the hypothesis is validated.
According to the traditional forensic investigation model, two primary phases
in a crime scene investigation procedure are: (1) collection of evidences from the
crime scene and (2) examination of acquired evidences at the forensic laboratory.
The detailed classification of sub-stages is shown in Figure 2.2.
22

Figure 2.2: Stages in a traditional forensic investigation model

2.1.1

Evidence Collection
There is surplus evidence available at any major crime scene; however, it

takes the ability and skill set of the investigator to relate them to the nature of the
case. The greatest challenge for the investigator resides in the process to locate and
acquire the right set of evidences. The underlying reason is simple because the person
committing a crime would obviously use techniques to hide it from the investigators
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vision. Acquiring evidence also takes a significant amount of time depending on the
nature of the case. Digital crimes are often complex in nature and require longer
time for the investigator to find the related evidences to be analyzed. For example,
making a bit-steam copy of a suspects 40GB hard drive may take hours to complete.
Some cases may also involve splitting a major evidence into sub-parts for further
examination. The time spent in collecting the evidences at the crime scene depends
on the prior knowledge of evidences acquired in similar cases and also on the skill
set of the investigator. As criminal suspects get more and more educated about the
investigative procedures with the help of advancements in technology, evidences found
in a crime scene become less obvious.
There are several special characteristics of any digital storage medium that
make evidence analysis and interpretation especially challenging:
• Too much potential evidence: In any digital or computer-related crime, the
nature of the crime is often less obvious but highly malicious. As an example, in
an ID-theft attack, the victim will never know that his sensitive information has
been compromised unless notified by system administrators who may in turn
notice it after a long time following the commission of the attack. Upon clearly
validating the nature of the case, the investigator now has to think about various
venues to search for potential evidence. The storage capacity and number are
two main attributes that significantly distinguish physical and digital evidence.
• Too easy to contaminate: Traditionally, investigators wait at the laboratory
until potential evidences are acquired by forensic specialists at the crime scene.
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The process of handling and transporting evidence from the crime scene to the
laboratory is highly vulnerable to errors. Just as fingerprints or blood samples,
digital form of evidence can be damaged or corrupted unless safe and strict
procedures are followed by the forensic investigators. For example, when the
system is restarted to log back into a boot-manager mode for accessing sector
information about a disc or drive, it may immediately change its state which
can destroy some important traces of information.
Forensic cases which involve digital evidence are usually complex in nature
due to the massive amount of data to be analyzed and their non-volatile nature of
storage as well. An acquisition and investigation of a hard disk memory secured
from a computer system is a good example to describe the complex nature of digital
evidence. Three potential areas of concentration while acquiring evidences from a
crime scene are: (1) local hard drives, (2) local user shares and (3) network traffic. The
preference is usually given to the host data over network data. Other areas include
registry settings, log information, the Internet history, host-based security tools, antivirus logs, directory information on the file system, operating system updates and
patches2 . The rationale behind the complexity of analyzing digital evidences is due
to the presence of latent data and files which are protected using stronger encryption
algorithms. All forms of digital evidences can provide forensically relevant clues to
a forensic investigator. Consequently, a forensic investigator should have appropriate
skills to search and find the evidence that can be examined to its fullest extent.
Analysis of digital crime scenes could add complexities of several orders of magnitude.
2

Private communication with Anuj Soni from Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.
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The normal procedure in any crime scene involving digital evidences is to
reduce a potentially large evidence space to a manageable, yet case-relevant proportions. The initial search could end up with much more information since it may
contain evidence from direct sources (e.g., files, log information, etc.) and also any
related metadata generated during further investigation (e.g., time-stamps, author
information, file permissions, etc.) [1]. However, as the search continues with more
involvement of forensic expertise and tools, the amount of evidence will be rapidly
brought down to manageable levels. This is performed as an iterative process3 , as
shown in Figure 2.3, in order to generate a sequence of suspicious search points in a
crime scene. Each iteration may generate some additional evidences, but at the same
time reduces the overall information to be investigated during the laboratory investigation phase. Each evidence can also point to a completely new potential source of
data. Thus, for example, the forensic examiners may find a victim’s e-mail address
as a source of information during the initial search. However, at the same time, examiners may also find attachments in the same e-mail referring to stored files on a
removable universal serial bus (USB) drive, one that was not found during the initial
search procedure. Under these circumstances, the forensic team may have to wait to
obtain search warrant from a law enforcement person to look for the newly discovered
USB drive. The final set of acquired information or evidence set is the one required
to the successful (or not successful) prosecution of the perpetrator of the crime in a
court of law.
3

The final shape of the information-investigation curve is dependent upon the investigator’s skill
set and the forensic tools and expertise available [4].
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Figure 2.3: Evidence generated during the search phase of an investigation cycle [4]

2.1.2

Evidence Analysis
In an evidence analysis phase, an investigator typically connects the dots to

paint a complete justification for the case. The investigators must provide evidencespecific results to answer questions like who, what, when, where and how [28]. More
importantly, the investigators should provide sufficient reasoning and justification as
to why the results of examination are significant with respect to solving the case. The
analysis phase in a digital crime scene investigation procedure generally encompasses
three sub-stages as follows:
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(1) Preparation: This is the preliminary process in which the collected data is made
ready for processing. For all evidences, whether seized or secured, it is essential
to maintain a master copy4 of the original data to be examined. From this point,
an investigator will begin to work on further analysis using the secondary or
duplicate copy. While making duplicate copy, subtle changes to the master copy
are permitted if necessary. For instance, the memory and log files may be slightly
modified in the event of start up and shut down of the system.
In digital forensics, a bit-stream image5 is created in order to avoid the risk of
contaminating any part of the master evidence. At any point of time during investigation, if any change to the original data occurs, an examiner could always
perform a benchmark with the master copy and obtain a new authenticated duplicate copy to recommence the analysis. As a general rule, the examiner must
only examine the duplicates throughout the process of entire investigation. Also,
a forensic analyst must not continue further with the investigation if the investigation is beyond the scope of his/her knowledge or skill level.
In order to handle the huge amount of evidences, investigators normally adapt
triage6 methodology to select the right set of evidences to be analyzed and to
4

Master copy is simply an authenticated copy maintained at all times during the examination for
future reference.
5
A bit-stream image is a sector-by-sector or bit-by-bit copy of a hard drive. A bit-stream image
is actually a set of files that can be used to create an exact copy of a hard drive, preserving all latent
data in addition to the files and directory structures.
6
Triage [28] refers to the process of determining which requirements a product should satisfy
given the time and resources available, and it comprises three main activities:
(a) Establish relative priorities for requirements. This may include establishing priority-related
interdependencies as well.
(b) Estimate the resources needed to satisfy each requirement. This may include establishing
resource-related interdependencies as well.
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optimize the overall investigation process as well. Essentially, the triage method
defines those items, pieces of evidence or potential containers of evidence that
are the most important or volatile, which need to be dealt first. The process of
triage benefits the investigation by obtaining successful results in a short amount
of time, yet not deviating from the scope of the case.
(2) Examination: Each digital evidence has a significant amount of physical component which does not impose any particular challenge. However, the evidence,
while stored in these physical items, is latent and exists only in a metaphysical
electronic form. The result that is reported from the examination is the recovery
of this latent information [29]. Although forensic laboratories are very good at
ensuring the integrity of the physical items in their control, computer forensics
also require methods to ensure the integrity of the information contained within
those physical items. The challenge to digital forensic researchers is to develop
methods and techniques that provide valid and reliable results while protecting
the real evidence from being mishandled. To complicate the matter further, digital evidence almost never exists in isolation. It is a combined product of the
data stored that include the application used to create and store it, and the computer system that is used to direct these activities. To a lesser extent, it is also
a product of the software tools used in the laboratory to extract it.
(c) Select a subset of requirements that optimizes the probability of the product success in its
intended market, whether commercial or internal. This may be relative to the resource constraints.
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The preliminary forensic examination, in addition to interpreting acquired evidences and making it available to other investigators involved in the case, allows
the creation of a feedback loop which facilitates the discovery of new related
evidences which may open new avenues for investigation [30, 31]. This process
could also improve the overall investigation procedure by altering the previously
assumed triage levels or feedback loops. The importance of evidences in fraud
case is thus determined by the inferences drawn from the experiences of previous
similar investigations. Upon following the triage and feedback loops evidences are
ranked in terms of priority with respect to the nature of the case. This may significantly reduce the well-known scope creep problem in digital forensics, since the
analysis of the acquired evidences may eliminate the need of further examination
of related additional evidences that are not very critical.
The examination results eventually lead to the crime scene reconstruction that
involves the process of forming a hypothesis of the sequence of events before
the actual crime was committed. The evidences are examined and compared
according to witness statements to determine whether additional evidences might
be needed for further investigation. The investigator then attempts to determine
what evidences make a perfect fit into the overall crime scene scenario. This
process helps to link a suspect with the crime scene or vice-versa, establish the
identity of a victim or a suspect and even further be able to acquit the innocent.
(3) Analysis: An analysis is the process of interpreting the extracted data to draw
conclusions upon investigating the evidences and to determine the significance of
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the investigated evidences to the case [32]. The analysis of digital evidences can
be sub-divided into two main approaches:
• Time-Frame Analysis: Time-frame analysis helps in determining the time of
the occurrence of events by examining specific time stamps to link evidences
relevant to the investigation. Various parts of a computer system can be
monitored for obtaining date and time stamps such as application, file, error,
event and security logs.
• Data-Hiding Analysis: Data-hiding analysis helps in recovering and detecting evidential data concealed on a system under investigation. This data
analysis is very important in digital forensic investigation as it justifies the
ownership, knowledge and intent of analyzed data. The main techniques
used in data hiding are modifying file headers, steganography7 , file compression schemes and gaining access to host-protected area (HPA).

2.2

Related Literature
The first basic crime scene investigation model proposed by Pollitt [33] requires

the completion of three primary steps, namely, acquisition, identification, and evaluation of computer forensic investigation before admission of the evidence in court.
During the acquisition phase, evidences are acquired in an acceptable manner with
proper approval from the legal authority. This is followed by the identification phase
7

The art and science of hiding information by embedding messages within other, seemingly harmless messages. Steganography works by replacing bits of useless or unused data in regular computer
files (such as graphics, sound, text, HTML, or even floppy disks) with bits of different, invisible
information. This hidden information can be plaintext, ciphertext, or even images.
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where the task is to identify the digital components from the acquired evidences and
converting it into a readable format well understood by human mind. The evaluation phase comprises tasks to determine whether the components identified in the
previous phase are indeed relevant to the case being investigated and whether they
can be considered as legitimate evidences. During the final admission phase, the acquired, extracted and examined evidences are presented to prove that the suspect has
committed crime in a court of law. This model further described the fact that the
path taken by any digital evidence comprises media (physical context), data (logical
context) and information (legal context).
The major theme of subsequent research in digital forensic investigations has
been related to the identification of the number of stages and phases of a digital crime
scene investigation. For example, the Abstract Digital Forensics Model (ADFM) proposed by Reith et al. [34] provides a generalized methodology that judicial members can use to relate technology to non-technical observers. Further, this model
introduced three significant phases: preparation, approach strategy and returning
evidence. Carrier and Spafford [35] presented the Integrated Digital Investigation
Process (IDIP) model. The 17-stages in this model are organized into five major
phases, namely, readiness phase, deployment phase, physical crime scene investigation phase, digital crime scene investigation phase and review phase. Kohn, Eloff
and Olivier [36] presented a digital forensic investigation framework which grouped
all phases derived from the experience of previous models into three primary stages:
preparation, investigation and presentation.
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Baryamureeba and Tushabe [37] proposed the Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIP) by adding two new phases: trace back and dynamite
phases. This model separates the investigations at the primary and secondary crime
scenes. The reconstruction of events in this model is only done after all investigations
have taken place. Beebe and Clark [38] used a multi-tier hierarchical objective-based
framework model to guide digital investigations. By combining and generalizing the
existing models, Ciardhuáin [39] addressed certain activities that are not included
in the earlier research. Unlike previous models, this model explicitly represents the
information flows in an investigation and captures the full scope of an investigation,
rather than only the processing of evidences. Kerrigan [40] proposed and presented
the Digital Investigation as a Capability Maturity Model (DI-CMM) as a tool for
analyzing an organization’s digital investigation capability. This model can be applied to real-time digital investigations to improve its current capabilities and how
the methodology highlights differences with an organization’s subjective perception
of its capabilities.
Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) proposed by Rogers
et al. [41,42] is designed to complete digital forensic investigation in a short time frame
without the requirement of taking the system/media back to the laboratory for an indepth examination or acquisition of a complete forensic image. This model presents an
on-site or field approach for providing the identification, analysis and interpretation
of digital evidence. This model had six phases: planning, triage, usage/user profiles, chronology/timeline, and the Internet activity and case specific evidence. The
authors of this model considered time as an expensive commodity in some special
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cases where results are balanced against the time spent in the forensic investigation
procedure. This model is consistent with various other models and general enough
to be applied across a wide spectrum of investigations. Bulbul et al. [43] developed
the Analytical Crime Scene Procedural Model (ACSPM) that primarily focuses on
digital crime scene investigation procedures rather than focusing on whole digital investigation process and phases that end up in a court. This model clearly analyzed
the relevant literature models in an analytical way in order to provide a model with
thorough and secure implementation of digital forensic investigation procedures at a
crime scene.
Freiling and Schwittay [44] proposed a model with a two-fold purpose: Incident
Response to focus on restoration of normal service and Computer Forensics to focus on
the presentation of evidence in a court of law. The stages of this model are pre-incident
preparation, pre-analysis, analysis and post analysis. Overill et al. [45] proposed
triage template pipelines to guide the investigation procedure, enabling devices and
data that they contain to be examined according to a number prioritized criteria.
This approach is specifically targeted over examinations done at the laboratory and
hence is significantly different from the on-site triage forensics dealt by Rogers et
al. [41]. A model for handling incident analysis and digital forensic investigations in
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and industrial control systems
was proposed by Spyridopoulos et al. [46]. In the light of significance of SCADA for
the resilience of critical infrastructures and the related incidents against them, this
model focuses on analyzing the current capabilities of SCADA operations to handle
security incidents from a robust cyber security and digital investigation perspective.
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Further, this model analyses the logging capabilities of SCADA systems and the
analytical and investigative tools that help in managing the forensic readiness of the
current threat requirements.
Zainudin et al. [47] extended the existing models to form a focused investigatory model for online social networks (OSN) such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.
Bogen and Dampier [48] presented a software engineering perspective with a core set
of modeling views for a unified computer forensics modeling methodology: investigative process view, case domain view, and evidence view. The authors of this
model describes investigative process as a sequence of activities relating to standard
operating procedures and examiners′ notes. To assist the forensic analyst in the evidence search process, Herrerias and Gomez [49] developed the log correlation model
to collect, filter and correlate events coming from diverse log files in a computer8 .
Dynamic forensic model used principles from cell immunity theory to model
and analyze the digital forensic investigation of evidences [50]. It relies on collecting
real time network intrusion evidence dynamically, and saving it in a secure location, for later use during forensic examinations. Sun et al. [51] proposed a forensic
investigation model that applies probability theory and graph modeling approach
to validate the reasoning process behind forensic investigation of digital evidences.
Their methodology proposes an abstraction procedure for evidences using edges in a
graph and calculating the probability of each node as its credence. By doing this, the
probability factor for an evidence to be credible is found. This value is compared to
a pre-determined threshold value to find whether the evidence can be accepted by a
8

Log files are specific files that are generated to keep a history of actions occurred on the system.
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judge in a court of law. Wang and Daniels [52] applied graph modeling approaches
to network forensic analysis to facilitate evidence presentation, automated reasoning,
and interactive hypothesis testing in an attempt to identify the attacker’s non-explicit
attack activities from the secondary evidence.
From the brief literature review described above, it is evident that a plethora
of prior research has been carried out in developing models to improve the digital
forensic investigation procedure. However, most of them are conceptual frameworks
illustrating the stage-by-stage analysis of CSI procedure. Very few existing studies
have focused on developing and solving quantitative models related to CSI. Most of
the procedural models [33–38] dealing with the investigation of digital evidences have
the following shortcomings:
• The conceptual framework dealt within these models staring from identification of evidences through the documentation of results can be extremely timeconsuming, given the volume and nature of data to examine. In most cases, this
involves creating forensic backup copies of selected evidences along with transfer
of these evidences from the crime scene to the laboratory in a forensically safe
and sound manner for thorough examination and analysis.
• These models do not clearly distinguish between methodologies that can be
followed uniquely in crime scene and laboratory to improve the effectiveness
obtained from an overall digital forensic investigation procedure. As a general
fact, equal priority and importance must be given to the laboratory analysis
procedures as given to the acquisition of evidences in a crime scene.
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• The current research models do not take into account the time factor involved in
forensic investigations. While the proposed methods may work quite effective in
situations where time is not considered as a critical factor, it is not sufficient in
time-critical forensic cases9 . In these situations the need for quick information
and investigation outweighs the need for an in-depth analysis of all potential
digital evidences back in a laboratory environment [41].
Since there is usually an enormous amount of evidence collected from a digital
crime scene, an investigation process becomes complicated and time-consuming. In
order to solve this complexity, available time has to be effectively shared among the
investigators to analyze the acquired evidences. Also, analyzing more evidences that
are not related to the nature of the case will ultimately increase the scope creep
problem. Hence, two major challenges for a digital investigation procedure are to
select and prioritize the right set of evidences and to allocate time and investigators
for the selected evidences. The former problem can be solved simply, by formulating a
mathematical rule of prioritization of evidences which is also referred to as the triage
process in which the evidences are ranked in terms of relevance or importance to the
nature of the case.
In summary, it is evident from the brief review of existing work that no light
has been thrown on developing and analyzing the digital forensic investigation process
using analytical techniques. Further, the authors in the literature has mostly dealt
9

Time-critical forensic cases refer to specific cases where acquisition, examination and presentation of results must be completed within a given time deadline, acceptable by a court of law.
Examples of these time-critical situations include child abductions, larger dimension cyber attacks
such as DoS, Man-in-the-Middle, Phishing attacks, etc.
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with conceptual and procedural models for analyzing and improving the overall investigation procedure. Also, time of investigation was not considered as a significant
factor in the process of evidence examination. Further, no existing model applied
mathematical optimization modeling to select and allocate resources in digital forensic investigations. Realizing the above weaknesses of the existing literature, for the
first time, this dissertation proposes a Mixed Integer Linear Programming [MILP]
optimization model which distinguishes between sequential and parallel scenario for
evidence analysis and examination. The goal of this proposed model is to maximize
the overall effectiveness in identifying the perpetrator of the crime.

2.3

Sequential and Parallel Examination of Evidences
As shown in Figure 2.4, an analysis of the existing literature reveals that the

primary step in a digital forensic investigation starts with the identification, acquisition and examination of evidences related to the nature of crime, collectively called
the evidence collection phase at the crime scene. Following the collection of evidences
from the digital crime scene, the acquired evidences are analyzed, and the results are
documented and presented for case resolution termed as the evidence investigation
phase in the computer forensic laboratory. In the process of analyzing these evidences,
the challenges encountered by an investigator would be to make a decision whether
to include or discard an evidence obtained from the crime scene and to allocate appropriate processing times for those evidences included in the investigation process.
The effectiveness of an evidence in a digital fraud case is determined by the inferences
drawn from the investigator’s experiences with the previous similar investigations.
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Figure 2.4: Stages in a digital forensic investigation procedure [53]

Evidence analysis and investigations in a laboratory can be classified into two
basic scenarios: parallel and sequential. In the parallel scenario, as soon as an evidence
is acquired at the crime scene, it is sent to the laboratory for analysis. An immediate
examination and analysis of this evidence would help the team at the crime scene
to determine what additional evidences need to be collected for further analysis and
what evidences need to be discarded that do not fall under the scope of investigation.
Also, there might be evidences that are not available until a particular time instance of
the whole investigation. This process continues until the deadline of the investigation
is reached.
In the sequential scenario, on the other hand, the investigation in the laboratory will begin only after the acquisition of all evidences from the crime scene.
Compared to the sequential scenario, if the investigation is carried out in a parallel
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Figure 2.5: Sequential examination of evidences in a laboratory setting

manner between the crime scene and the laboratory, the whole investigation process
could be completed earlier. However, in a parallel effort, we may fail to collect some
critical evidences because the initial laboratory investigations may fail to reveal their
need. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the sequential and parallel examination of evidences in a laboratory setting, following the acquisition of evidences from a crime
scene. In Figure 2.6, each line represents the collection of evidence and sending it for
investigation to the laboratory, as soon the evidences become available from a crime
scene.
In order to increase the effectiveness of crime scene investigation, development
and deployment of a mathematical model to analyze the digital forensic investigation
procedures would be advantageous. With this in view, the next section formulates
the sequential digital forensic investigation problem and establish its computational
complexity.
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Figure 2.6: Parallel examination of evidences in a laboratory setting

2.4
2.4.1

Sequential Digital Forensic Model with Single Investigator
Effectiveness of Evidence Analysis
The planning, organization and coordination of work between the crime scene

and the laboratory aims at deploying available resources commensurate to the case
being investigated. The overall effectiveness of a digital CSI procedure can be achieved
by utilizing and multi-tasking the limited available resources in an efficient manner.
The effectiveness obtained by investigating an evidence for a specified time limit is
a numerical measure of the value for apprehending the suspect and establishing a
crime in a court of law. This value can be only found by using empirical analysis
of actual crime scene investigation cases involving digital evidences, encountered in
the past. Further in real life situations, this numerical measure of effectiveness may
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be a non-linear function of time. As a first approximation, we assume that this
non-linear function can be approximated as a linear function of time, independent
of other evidences. Thus, in this dissertation, we assume that the effectiveness rate
(i.e., effectiveness per unit time) of an evidence is constant and independent of other
evidences. Further, the total effectiveness of a CSI is the sum of the effectiveness of
investigating the evidences.

2.4.2

Problem Formulation
To define the problem considered in this section, we assume that all evidences

have been acquired successfully. Thus, our focus is on selecting the evidences to be
investigated in the laboratory and the time to be spent on investigating each selected
evidence. Further, to keep the model formulation and presentation simple, we make
the following assumptions:
• No interdependencies exist between the evidences.
• Effectiveness of evidence investigation depends on nature of the case and is
known to the investigator.
• All selected evidences are investigated by a single investigator.
• The total effectiveness generated by investigating an evidence is a linear function
of the time spent on its investigation.
• The budgetary/legal restrictions limit the total time available to investigate all
evidences.
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To formulate the digital forensic investigation problem, consider the following
scenario: in a given digital crime scene, a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} evidences are collected and sent to the laboratory for investigation by a single investigator. Therefore,
associated with each evidence i ∈ N , there is an effectiveness rate βi that depicts the
effectiveness of investigating an evidence i for one time unit. However, if evidence
i is selected for investigation, a minimum amount of time ai must be spent on it.
Further, the effectiveness of investigating an evidence i reaches its maximum when
bi > ai time units are spent on its investigation. Thus, there is no need to spend
more than bi time units in investigating evidence i. Because of budgetary and/or
legal restrictions, the total time available to complete the investigation of this digital
crime scene investigation is limited to a total of T units.
With the above assumptions and description, the digital forensic crime scene
investigation problem consists of finding the amount of time ti to be spent on each
evidence i such that
idences,

Pn

i=1

Pn

i=1 ti

≤ T and the total effectiveness of investigating all ev-

βi ti is maximized where for each evidence i ∈ N , either ti = 0 or

ai ≤ ti ≤ bi . To mathematically formulate this problem, without loss of generality,
we assume that evidences are arranged such that β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βn . If not, this
can be done in O(nlogn) computational effort by rearranging and renumbering the
evidences. For each evidence i ∈ N , let Xi be a binary variable that takes on a value
of 1 if evidence i is selected for investigation and 0 otherwise. Then, the above problem can be formulated as the following mixed integer linear programming problem
(MILP).
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Problem P

max E =

Pn

i=1

βi ti

(2.1)

subject to:
n
X

ti

≤ T,

t i − X i bi

≤ 0;

for all

i ≤ n,

(2.3)

t i − X i ai

≥ 0;

for all

i ≤ n,

(2.4)

for all

i ≤ n.

(2.5)

(2.2)

i=1

Xi = 0 or 1;

The objective function (2.1) seeks to maximize total effectiveness of the digital
fraud investigation. The first constraint (2.2) ensures that total time spent on all
evidences does not exceed the maximum allowable time T . Constraint set (2.3) states
that the time spent on each evidence i is no more than its upper bound bi . Constraint
set (2.4) ensures that the time spent on each selected evidence i is no less than its
lower bound ai . The final integer (binary) constraints (2.5) determines whether the
evidence is included or discarded from the investigation.
For the above formulation, the total number of binary variables is n while the
total number of constraints is 2n + 1. Thus, the overall size of the MILP seems quite
manageable. An interesting feature of Problem P is the fact that the binary integer
variables Xi are needed only to assure the feasibility of the solution (i.e., to resolve
the disjunctive constraints on the selection of any given evidence). As we will show
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in the next section, if these disjunctive constraints are not needed, the problem is
solvable in a polynomially bounded computational effort.

2.4.3

Problem Complexity
We now show that the sequential digital forensic investigation problem con-

sidered in this paper is NP-hard, at least in the ordinary sense [53]. To do so, we first
show that Problem P is NP-hard at least in the ordinary sense.
Lemma 2.1. Problem P is NP-hard in the ordinary sense.
Proof. Consider the following standard NP-hard knapsack problem where a knapsack
of weight capacity W is to be loaded with items from the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n
items where the weight of each item i ∈ N is wi and if loaded into a knapsack, its
profit is pi . The objective is to maximize the profit from the knapsack. By defining a
binary variable for each i ∈ N , Xi that takes on a value of 1 if an item is loaded into
the knapsack and 0 otherwise, this knapsack problem is formulated as follows:
Problem K

max E =

Pn

i=1

pi X i

(2.6)

subject to:
n
X

w i Xi

≤ W.

(2.7)

i=1

Xi = 0 or 1;
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for all

i ≤ n.

(2.8)

Now, let W = T , pi = βi ai , wi = ai , and ti = Xi ai . Then, the above standard
knapsack problem K can be stated as the following problem:
Problem S

max E =

Pn

i=1

βi ti

(2.9)

subject to:
n
X

ti

≤T

ti

= X i ai ;

(2.10)

i=1

Xi = 0 or 1;

for all

i ≤ n,

(2.11)

for all

i ≤ n.

(2.12)

Now, a comparison of Problem S above represented by relationships (2.9)
through (2.12) with Problem P represented by relationships (2.1) through (2.5) shows
that Problem S is a special case of Problem P where ai = bi for all i ∈ N . Therefore,
the standard knapsack problem K is polynomially reducible to problem S which is a
special case of Problem P. Since Problem K is known to be NP-hard in the ordinary
sense [54, 55], it follows that both Problems S and P are NP-hard in the ordinary
sense.


As a consequence of Lemma 2.1 above, we have the following result.

Theorem 2.1. Sequential digital forensic investigation problem is NP-hard in the
ordinary sense.
Proof. If the digital forensic investigation problem is polynomially solvable, then
Problem P will also be polynomially solvable. However, Lemma 2.1 shows that Prob46

lem P is NP-hard in the ordinary sense. Therefore, it follows that the digital forensic
investigation problem is also NP-hard in the ordinary sense.



While Theorem 2.1 shows that the digital forensic investigation problem considered in this paper is NP-hard in the ordinary sense, its status as to its NP-hardness
in the strong sense still remains open. We now turn to the development of the proposed solution algorithms that can provide optimal or near-optimal solutions to the
problem considered in Section 2.4.1.

2.4.4

Polynomially Solvable Cases
In view of the proof that the problem formulated in Section 2.4.1 is NP-hard,

we now describe the formulation and polynomially bounded solution procedures for
two special cases [56].
Case 1: Zero Minimum Investigation Time
We first consider the case where ai = 0 for each evidence i. In this case, there
are no disjunctive constraints and hence the integer variables Xi are not needed in
the problem formulation. Therefore, for Case 1, the optimization Problem P reduces
to the following Problem P1:
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Problem P1

max E

=

Pn

i=1

βi ti

(2.13)

subject to:
n
X

ti

≤ T,

t i − bi

≤ 0;

(2.14)

i=1

for all

i ≤ n.

(2.15)

We solve Problem P1 by allocating bi time units for all (s − 1) evidences until
Ps−1
i=1

bi exceeds the total investigation deadline T and the remaining time, T −

Ps−1
i=1

bi

for the sth evidence. We do so by using the following Algorithm P1:
Algorithm P1
Inputs. A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n evidences. For each evidence i ∈ N , effectiveness rate is βi and upper bound on the investigating time is bi . Total available
investigation time is T .
Assumption. Effectiveness rates are in a decreasing order i.e., β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥ βn . If
not, evidences are renumbered so that this assumption is valid.
Step 1. Find s such that

Ps−1
i=1

bi ≤ T <

Ps

i=1 bi .

Step 2. The optimal solution is as follows: The optimal investigation time of each
evidence i ∈ N , ti , is: ti = bi for i ≤ (s − 1), ts = T −

Ps−1
i=1

bi and ti = 0 for all

i > s.
Step 3. Calculate E ∗ =

Pn

j=1

βj t∗j and STOP.

Outputs. Time spent on each evidence j ∈ N is the best solution found by Algorithm
P is t∗j and total effectiveness as E ∗ .
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Theorem 2.2. Algorithm P1 optimally solves Problem P1 in O(n) computational
effort.
Proof. We note that Problem P1 is a continuous bounded knapsack problem. Developments by Dantzig [57] show that this continuous bounded knapsack problem can
be solved in O(n) computational effort. Algorithm P1 is simply the formalization of
Dantzig’s developments and hence can be executed in O(n) computational effort. 
Case 2: Must Investigate All Evidences
In the second case, all evidences must be investigated. This implies that
Pn

i=1

ai ≤ T , i.e., sufficient time is available to investigate all evidences for their

minimum possible times. In formulating this special case, the binary variable, Xi
is not needed as all n evidences are selected. Therefore, Problem P reduces to the
following polynomially solvable linear programming Problem P2:
Problem P2

max E =

Pn

i=1

βi ti

(2.16)

subject to:
n
X

ti

≤ T,

t i − bi

≤ 0;

for all

i ≤ n,

(2.18)

t i − ai

≥ 0;

for all

i ≤ n.

(2.19)

(2.17)

i=1

We propose the following algorithm to optimally solve Problem P2.
Algorithm P2
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Inputs. A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n evidences. For each evidence i ∈ N , effectiveness
rate is βi and lower and upper bounds on investigating times are ai and bi ,
respectively. Total available investigation time T .
Assumption. Effectiveness rates are in a decreasing order i.e., β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥
βn . If not, evidences are renumbered so that this assumption is valid. Further,
T ≥

Pn

i=1

ai which implies all evidences must at least be investigated until their

minimum time limits are reached.
Step 1. For each evidence i ∈ N , t′i = ti − ai , b′i = bi − ai , and T ′ = T −
Step 2. Find s such that

Ps−1
i=1

b′i ≤ T ′ <

Pn

i=1

ai .

Ps

′
i=1 bi .

Step 3. The optimal investigation time of each evidence i ∈ N , ti , is as follows: t∗i = bi
for i ≤ (s − 1), t∗s = as + [T ′ −
Step 4. Calculate E ∗ =

Pn

j=1

Ps−1
i=1

b′i ] and t∗i = ai for all i > s.

βj t∗j and STOP.

Outputs. Time spent on each evidence j ∈ N is the best solution found by Algorithm
P is t∗j and total effectiveness as E ∗ .
Theorem 2.3. Algorithm P2 optimally solves Problem P2 in O(n) computational
effort.
Proof. It is easy to see that Problem P2 can be transformed to an equivalent Problem
P1 in O(n) computational effort. To do so, the decision variables and parameters of
Problem P1 are defined as follows. For each evidence i ∈ N , t′i = ti − ai , b′i = bi − ai ,
and T ′ = T −

Pn

i=1

ai . Therefore, the proof of Theorem 2.3 follows from Theorem

2.2.
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2.4.5

Heuristic Algorithms for Problem P
While the compact MILP formulation can solve moderately large-sized prob-

lem instances to optimality in a fraction of a second, Problem P is NP-hard. This
implies that it is likely that there may be several problem instances which cannot be
optimized in a finite and acceptable amount of computational effort to be of practical
use. Therefore, in view of NP-hard nature of the general Problem P, we must use
appropriate heuristic algorithms in finding an optimal or a near-optimal solution.
Our first heuristic algorithm is adapted from the truncation of the solution
obtained by Algorithm P1 proposed in Section 2.4.3. Since all ai values are not zero
in the general case, it is possible that the solution obtained by Algorithm P1 is not
feasible for Problem P. Therefore, if needed for feasibility, the solution is truncated by
ignoring the remaining time available after evidence s−1. The steps of this truncated
algorithm are as follows:
Algorithm T
Inputs. A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n evidences. For each evidence i ∈ N , effectiveness rate βi and lower and upper bounds on investigating times are ai and bi ,
respectively. Total available investigation time T .
Assumption. Effectiveness rates are in a decreasing order i.e., β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥ βn . If
not, evidences are renumbered so that this assumption is valid.
Step 1. Find s such that

Ps−1

i=1 bi ≤ T <

Ps

i=1 bi .

Step 2. Set t∗j = bj for j ≤ (s − 1) and t∗j = 0 for all j > s. If T −
t∗s = T −

Ps−1
i=1

bi ; otherwise, set t∗s = 0.
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Ps−1
i=1

bi ≥ as , set

Step 3. Calculate E ∗ =

Pn

j=1

βj t∗j and STOP.

Outputs. Time spent on each evidence j ∈ N is t∗j and total effectiveness as E ∗ . This
is the best solution found by Algorithm T.
The effectiveness of the naive truncated Algorithm T can be improved by
finding an evidence which can utilize the remaining time and hence can increase the
total effectiveness of the investigation. For this purpose, the following developments
help us in proposing an effective and polynomially bounded heuristic algorithm for
general Problem P.
Theorem 2.4. An optimal solution exists where at most one evidence falls strictly
in between its minimum and maximum time limits for investigation.
Proof. Follows from contradiction. Assume that two evidences j and k are in an
optimal solution such that, βj > βk , aj < t∗j < bj and ak < t∗k < bk . The best value of
∗
effectiveness contributed by these two evidences is Ejk
= t∗j βj + t∗k βk . Since βj > βk ,

we note that a simultaneous decrease in t∗k and increase in t∗j will increase the value of
∗
Ejk
. Therefore, we decrease the value of t∗k and increase the value of t∗j by the same

amount such that either t∗k = ak and/or t∗j = aj . In either case, there is at most one
evidence left which is strictly between its minimum and maximum value. Further,
the value of total effectiveness for this new solution is higher than that of the original
solution implying that the original solution cannot be optimal.



Theorem 2.4 provides an effective way to search for an optimal solution. To
do so, we note that Problem P is a disjunctive continuous doubly bounded knapsack
problem. The major difficulty to seek an optimal solution to this problem is caused
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by the disjunctive nature of this problem as it gives rise to constraint sets (2.3), (2.4)
and (2.5) involving binary integer variables. As our first attempt, we propose to use
Algorithm P1 presented earlier. If the solution so obtained is feasible, then using
Theorem 2.2, it must be optimal as the lower limits on the investigation times do not
affect the feasible solution. However, if the solution obtained by Algorithm P1 is not
feasible, then we attempt to find a feasible solution with the best total effectiveness.
To do so, we attempt to decrease the investigation time assigned to evidence s−1 and
attempt to use the remaining time such that either the time assigned to investigation
s−1 equals as−1 or an evidence is found that can be assigned its minimum investigation
time. Let T ′ = T −

Ps−1
i=1

bi where

Ps−1
i=1

bi < T <

Ps

i=1 bi

and that the evidences

are arranged in the decreasing order of their effectiveness rates. Further, consider an
evidence candidate i ≥ s for including evidences to be investigated. Then, we have
the following result.
Lemma 2.2. For a given evidence i > s, if ai − T ′ ≤ bs−1 − as−1 and Ei =
max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )]βi − max[ai − T ′ , min(bi − T ′ , 0)]βs−1 > 0, then the inclusion of
evidence i in those selected for investigation will increase the total effectiveness.
Proof. ai − T ′ ≤ bs−1 − as−1 is a necessary condition for the feasibility of replacing
some time from evidence s−1 to evidence i. Further, we note that max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )]
represents the maximum time that can be allocated to evidence i by giving up some
time from evidence s − 1. Similarly, max[ai − T ′ , min(bi − T ′ , 0)] is the corresponding
time to be given up from evidence s−1. Therefore, total change in the effectiveness of
the changed solution is Ei = max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )]βi − max[ai − T ′ , min(bi − T ′ , 0)]βs−1
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which if greater than zero will show that the inclusion of evidence i in those selected
for investigation increases the total effectiveness of the solution.



As mentioned earlier, for general Problem P, use of Algorithm P1 will provide
an optimal solution if after Step 1 of algorithm, T −

Ps−1
i=1

bi ≥ as . If that is not

the case, we infer that the solution for evidences {1, 2, . . . , s − 2} given by Algorithm
P1 can be retained. For the remaining evidences, we generate solution A in which
we attempt to reduce the time spent on evidence s − 1 with a view to improve the
solution by possibly including evidences {s, s + 1, . . . , n} in the solution. In order to
do so, we use the results from Lemma 2.2 to assure that the effectiveness gained by
including evidence j ≥ s must be more than the loss incurred by reducing the time
spent on evidence s − 1 to its minimum time as−1 .
However, it is possible that no evidence i ≥ s can be included in solution
A since we need to assign at least as−1 time units to evidence s − 1. Therefore,
we generate another solution B in which we try to discard evidence s − 1 with a
view to improve the solution by possibly including evidences {s, s + 1, . . . , n} in the
solution. In order to do so, we note that the effectiveness gained by including evidence
j ≥ s must be more than the loss incurred by excluding the evidence s − 1. For this
purpose, we use Lemma 2.2 again with the exception that we replace s − 1 with
s − 2. Following these computations, the best solution is obtained by comparing net
effectiveness generated by solutions A and B. Using this logic, our proposed heuristic
algorithm to solve Problem P is as follows.
Algorithm P
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Inputs. A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n evidences. For each evidence i ∈ N , effectiveness rate βi and lower and upper bounds on investigating times are ai and bi ,
respectively. Total available investigation time T .
Assumption. Effectiveness rates are in a decreasing order, i.e., β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥ βn .
If not, evidences are renumbered so that this assumption is valid.
Step 1. Find s such that

Ps−1
i=1

bi ≤ T <

Ps

i=1 bi .

for i ≤ (s − 1), and t∗i = 0 for all i ≥ s, E ∗ =

If T ′ = T −
Pn

i=1

Ps−1
i=1

bi = 0, set t∗i = bi

βi ∗ t∗i , and STOP; otherwise,

enter Step 2.
Step 2. If T ′ ≥ as , set t∗i = bi for i ≤ (s − 1), t∗s = T ′ and t∗i = 0 for all i > s,
E∗ =

Pn

i=1

βi ∗ t∗i , and STOP; otherwise, set t∗iA = t∗iA = bi for i ≤ (s − 2),

t∗iA = t∗iA = 0 for i > (s − 2), T ′′ = T −

Ps−2
i=1

bi and enter Step 3.

Step 3. Let δ be a subset of N evidences such that for each i ∈ δ, i ≥ s and
ai − T ′ ≤ bs−1 − as−1 . If δ = ∅, set t∗s−1,A = bs−1 and proceed to Step 5; otherwise,
enter Step 4.
Step 4. For each i ∈ δ, calculate Ei = max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )]βi − max[ai − T ′ , min(bi −
T ′ , 0)]βs−1 . Find k such that Ek = maxi∈δ Ei . If Ek > 0, set t∗kA = max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )],
t∗s−1,A = bs−1 − max[ai − T ′ , min(bi − T ′ , 0)]; otherwise, set t∗s−1,A = bs−1 and enter
Step 5.
Step 5. Calculate EA∗ =

Pn

i=1

βi ∗ t∗iA and enter Step 6.

Step 6. Set T ′ = T ′′ and t∗s−1,B = 0. Let σ be a subset of N evidences such that
for each i ∈ σ, i ≥ s and ai − T ′ ≤ bs−2 − as−2 . If σ = ∅, set t∗s−2,B = bs−2 and
proceed to Step 8; otherwise, enter Step 7.
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Table 2.1: Example data set for Problem P
i
βi
ai
bi

1
28
10
31

2
23
3
32

3
21
3
8

4
20
11
25

5
19
9
13

6
19
22
33

7
13
15
39

8
8
6
9

9
6
16
26

10
1
2
28

Step 7. For each i ∈ σ, calculate Ei = max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )]βi − max[ai − T ′ , min(bi −
T ′ , 0)]βs−2 . Find k such that Ek = maxi∈σ Ei . If Ek > 0, set t∗k,B = max[ai , min(bi , T ′ )],
t∗s−2,B = bs−2 − max[ai − T ′ , min(bi − T ′ , 0)]; otherwise, set t∗s−2,B = bs−2 and enter
Step 8.
Step 8. Calculate EB∗ =

Pn

i=1

βi ∗ t∗iB . If EA∗ > EB∗ , set t∗i = t∗iA , E ∗ = EA∗ and STOP.

Otherwise, set t∗i = t∗iB , E ∗ = EB∗ and STOP.
Outputs. E ∗ is the best total effectiveness; t∗i is the time spent on each evidence
i ∈ N.
Algorithm P requires O(n) computational effort since Steps 4 and 7 are executed only once in O(n) computational time. It also requires an additional O(nlogn)
computational effort for the initial ordering of βi , as stated in the assumption.
A Numerical Illustration
To illustrate the steps of Algorithms T and P, we solve the case of a 10-evidence
problem given in Table 2.1 with total investigation time T = 74.
Solution by Algorithm T: To solve the problem by Algorithm T in Table 2.1, we proceed as follows:
Step 1. We find that

P3

i=1 bi

= 71 < T = 74 and

set Ei = t∗iA = t∗iB = 0 for all i ≤ 10. We enter Step 2.
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P4

i=1 bi

= 96 > T = 74. We

Step 2. Since, T ′ = 3 < a4 = 11, we set t∗1 = 31, t∗2 = 32, t∗3 = 8, t∗s = 0 for all
s > 3 and enter Step 3.
Step 3. We calculate EA∗ = 28∗ 31 + 23∗ 32 + 21∗ 8 = 1772 and STOP.
Solution by Algorithm P: To solve the problem by Algorithm P in Table 2.1,
we proceed as follows:
Step 1. We find that

P3

i=1 bi

= 71 < T = 74 and

P4

i=1 bi

= 96 > T = 74. We

set Ei = t∗iA = t∗iB = 0 for all i ≤ 10. Since T ′ = 74 − 71 = 3 6= 0, we enter Step 2.
Step 2. Since, T ′ = 3 < a4 = 11, we set T ′ = 3, t∗1A = 31, t∗2A = 32,
T ′′ = 74 − 63 = 11, and enter Step 3.
Step 3. We find that δ = {8, 10}. Therefore, we proceed to Step 4.
Step 4. We calculate E8 = max[6, min(9, 3)]8 − max[6 − 3, 0]21 = −15 and
E10 = max[2, min(28, 3)]1 − max[2 − 3, 0]21 = 3. Since E10 > E8 , we set t∗10A =
max[2, min(28, 3)] = 3, t∗3A = 8 − max(2 − 3, 0) = 8 and proceed to Step 5.
Step 5. We calculate EA∗ = 28∗ 31 + 23∗ 32 + 21∗ 8 + 1∗ 3 = 1775 and enter Step
6.
Step 6. We set T ′ = T ′′ = 11, t∗1B = 31, t∗2B = 32 and t∗3B = 0. We find that
σ = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. Therefore, we proceed to Step 7.
Step 7. We calculate E4 = max[11, min(25, 11)]20 − max[11 − 11, 0]23 = 220,
E5 = max[9, min(13, 11)]19 − max[9 − 11, 0]23 = 209, E6 = max[22, min(33, 11)]19 −
max[22 − 11, 0]23 = 165, E7 = max[15, min(39, 11)]13 − max[15 − 11, 0]23 = 103,
E8 = max[6, min(9, 11)]8 − max[6 − 11, 0]23 = 72, E9 = max[16, min(26, 11)]6 −
max[16 − 11, 0]23 = −19, E10 = max[2, min(28, 11)]1 − max[2 − 11, 0]23 = 11. Since
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E4 is the maximum value for effectiveness, we set t∗4B = max[11, min(25, 11)] = 11,
t∗2B = 32 − max(11 − 11, 0) = 32 and proceed to Step 8.
Step 8. We calculate EB∗ = 28∗ 31 + 23∗ 32 + 20∗ 11 = 1824. Since, EB∗ > EA∗ ,
t∗1 = 31, t∗2 = 32, t∗3 = 0, t∗4 = 11 and E ∗ = 1824 are the solutions obtained by
Algorithm P.
From the above numerical illustration, it is clear that for this particular problem instance, solution obtained by Algorithm P is much better than the one obtained
by Algorithm T. In fact, the solution obtained by Algorithm P is optimal, as can
easily be verified by optimally solving the corresponding MILP using AIMMS version
3.13.

2.5

Sequential Digital Forensic Model with Multiple Investigators
Based on the previous approach in Section 2.4, we extend the model to consider

the situation involving multiple investigators. This model demonstrates the analytical
procedure for analysis of acquired evidences in the presence of multiple investigators
in a laboratory setting [58]. The parameters, variables and assumptions necessary to
formulate this model are described in subsequent Sections 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.

2.5.1

Parameters
To formulate the mathematical model considered in this section, we assume

that all the evidences have been collected successfully from the crime scene and focus
on the issue of assigning the evidences to the available investigators in the laboratory
and time spent for investigating each assigned evidence.
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• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set n evidences to be investigated.
• M = {1, 2, . . . , m} be a set of m available investigators.
• βe is the effectiveness for investigating evidence e per unit time and independent
of the skill set of investigator i.
• ae and be are the minimum and maximum times available for investigating
evidence e ∈ N , respectively.
• T is the total investigation time deadline.

2.5.2

Variables
We define the following two integer decision variables in the problem formula-

tion.
• tij is the time allocated for investigating evidence i ∈ N which is assigned to
investigator j ∈ M .
• Xij is an integer (binary) decision variable which takes a value of 1 if evidence
i is selected and assigned to investigator j and 0 otherwise.

2.5.3

Assumptions

• No interdependencies exist between the evidences.
• All investigators have the same forensic expertise in investigating an evidence
e.
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• Effectiveness rate βi depends on nature of the case and is known to the investigator.
• An evidence i is assigned and can be investigated by a single investigator.
• The total effectiveness generated upon investigating evidence i is a linear function of the time spent on its investigation (i.e., βi ∗ tij ).
• Because of budgetary constraints, the total time available to investigate a set
of evidences for each investigator cannot exceed T .
The problem considered in this section is one of finding the right assignment
of evidence i to investigator j and also the amount of time tij to be spent on each
evidence such that

Pn

i=1 tij

investigating all evidences,

≤ T for each investigator and the total effectiveness of
Pn

i=1

βi tij is maximized where for each evidence i, either

tij = 0 or ai ≤ tij ≤ bi .

2.5.4

Problem Formulation and Computational Complexity
In order to formulate the problem considered in Section 2.5, we assume that

evidences are so arranged that β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βn without loss of generality. If not,
this can be done in O(nlogn) computational effort by rearranging and renumbering
the evidences. Then, the MILP model formulation for the problem is as follows:
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Problem M

max E =

Pn Pm
i=1

j=1

βi tij

(2.20)

subject to:
n
X

tij

≤ T;

for all j ≤ m,

(2.21)

tij − Xij bi

≤ 0;

for all i ≤ n, j ≤ m

(2.22)

tij − Xij ai

≥ 0;

for all i ≤ n, j ≤ m

(2.23)

m
X

≤ 1;

for all i ≤ n,

(2.24)

for all i ≤ n, j ≤ m

(2.25)

i=1

Xij

j=1

Xij =

0 or 1;

where Xij is binary (0,1).

The objective function (2.20) formulated above seeks to maximize the overall
effectiveness of the investigation procedure. The first constraint stated in (2.21) ensures that the total time spent on a group of evidences does not exceed the maximum
allowable time T for each investigator. Constraint set (2.22) states that the time
spent on each selected evidence i is no more than its upper bound bi . Constraint
set (2.23) ensures that the time spent on each selected evidence i is no less than
its lower bound ai . Constraint (2.24) ensures that a particular evidence i cannot be
assigned to more than one investigator. Finally, the integer (binary) constraint set
(2.25) determines whether the evidence is selected and assigned to an investigator or
discarded from the investigation.
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Ignoring the constraint set (2.25) for the binary variables, the total number of
binary variables is n while the total number of constraints is 2n+2 . Thus, the overall
size of the MILP seems quite manageable. However, as formulated above, this MILP is
NP-hard and does not permit a polynomially bounded solution procedure to optimally
solve it. The integer variables Xij are needed to resolve the disjunctive constraints
on the selection, assignment and the investigation time of any given evidence.
We now show that the sequential digital forensic investigation problem involving multiple investigators is NP-hard, at least in the ordinary sense.
Theorem 2.5. Sequential digital forensic investigation problem with multiple investigators is NP-hard in the ordinary sense.
Proof. The sequential forensic investigation problem with a single investigator which
is a special case of the one with multiple investigators (i.e., M = 1) has been shown to
be NP-hard in the ordinary sense in Theorem 2.1. Therefore, the hierarchical nature
of the NP-hard problems [54] shows that the sequential digital forensic investigation
problem with multiple investigators is NP-hard in the ordinary sense.



While Theorem 2.5 shows that the sequential digital forensic investigation
problem with multiple investigators is NP-hard in the ordinary sense, its status as to
its NP-hardness in the strong sense still remains open.

2.5.5

Heuristic Algorithm for Problem M
Since Problem M in Section 2.5.4 is NP-hard, we now develop a heuristic

algorithm to find an optimal or approximately optimal solution to this problem. To
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do so, we note that Problem M is a doubly bounded multiple knapsack problem on
one hand and a parallel machine assignment problem on the other hand. The major
difficulty to seek an optimal solution to this problem is caused by the disjunctive
nature of this problem as it gives rise to constraint (2.24) and constraint sets (2.22),
(2.23) and (2.25) involving binary integer variables.
As the first attempt, we try to find an investigator with the maximum time
available within a given set of investigators. The first evidence in the sorted list is
then assigned to this investigator and the amount of time to be allocated is decided
for the evidence. If the time limit of the evidence is greater than the total time
available for the investigator, the evidence is skipped and we proceed to investigate
the next evidence in the list. This process is carried out until the total time available
for all investigators is utilized or all the evidences have been assigned to investigators.
Using this logic, the proposed heuristic algorithm to solve Problem M is described as
follows:
Algorithm M
Inputs. A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n evidences and a set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of m
investigators. For each evidence e ∈ N , effectiveness rate is βe and lower and
upper bounds on investigating times are ae and be , respectively. Total available
investigation time for each investigator i ∈ M is T .
Assumption. Effectiveness rates for evidences are in a decreasing order i.e., β1 ≥ β2 ≥
· · · ≥ βn . If not, evidences are renumbered so that this assumption is valid.
Step 1. For each e ∈ N , set Ee∗ = t∗ei = 0 and enter Step 2.
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Step 2. Set loop = 1 indicating the index of evidence being processed. Find investigator i ∈ M with maximum total time T available. If be ≤ T , assign t∗ei = be ,
update T = T − t∗ei and goto Step 5; else, if be > T , assign t∗ei = T when ae ≤ T ,
update T = T − t∗ei and goto Step 5 or enter Step 3, when ae > T ; otherwise, set
t∗ei = ae and goto Step 5.
Step 3. Let δ be a subset of N evidences such that for each e ∈ δ, ae − T ≤ 0 and
be − T > 0. If δ = ∅, proceed to Step 5; otherwise, enter Step 4.
Step 4. For each e ∈ δ, calculate Ee = max[T, ae ] ∗ βe . Find k such that Ek =
maxe∈δ Ee . If Ek > 0, set t∗ki = max[T, ae ] and update T = T − t∗ki ; otherwise, set
t∗ei = 0 and N = N − \e.
Step 5. If T = 0 or loop = n, proceed to Step 6. Otherwise, set e = e + 1 and return
to Step 2.
Step 6. Stop: Calculate E ∗ =

Pn

e=1

βe ∗ t∗ei .

Outputs. Time spent on each evidence e ∈ N assigned to investigator i ∈ M is the
best solution found by Algorithm M as t∗ei and total effectiveness as E ∗ .
Algorithm M requires O(n.m) computational effort for Steps 1-6. It also requires an additional O(nlogn) computational effort for the initial ordering of βi , as
stated in the assumption.
A Numerical Illustration
In order to illustrate the steps of Algorithm M presented in Section 2.5.5, we
solve Problem M with 10 evidences and three investigators as given in Table 2.2 with
total investigation deadline T = 101.
To solve the above example outlined in Table 2.3, we proceed as follows:
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Table 2.2: Example data set for heuristic Algorithm M
e
i
βe
ae
be

1
1
25
16
71

2
2
23
2
15

3
3
22
21
33

4
20
21
99

5
16
27
49

6
15
6
98

7
13
2
10

8
10
13
35

9
8
5
75

10
7
8
29

Step 1. For each e ∈ N , set Ee∗ = t∗ei = 0 and enter Step 2.
Step 2. We begin with e = 1, i.e., the first evidence in the sorted set N. We increment
e by 1 until T = 0 for each investigator or e = n, i.e., all evidences have been
either considered or discarded for the investigation. In each of the assignment
cyles below, the investigator with maximum time available is chosen:
Loop 1: Investigator i = 3; assigned time t∗13 =71, since b1 ≤ 101 and update T
= 30.
Loop 2: Investigator i = 2; assigned time t∗22 =15, since b2 ≤ 101 and update T
= 86.
Loop 3: Investigator i = 1; assigned time t∗31 =33, since b3 ≤ 101 and update T
= 68.
Loop 4: Investigator i = 2; assigned time t∗42 =86, since b4 ≤ 86 and update T =
0.
Loop 5: Investigator i = 1; assigned time t∗51 =49, since b5 ≤ 68 and update T =
19.
Loop 6: Investigator i = 3; assigned time t∗63 =30, since b6 ≤ 30 and update T =
0.

65

Table 2.3: Assignments by executing Steps 2 through 5 of heuristic Algorithm M
e
i
tei

1
3
71

2
2
15

3
1
33

4
2
86

5
1
49

6
3
30

7
1
10

8
-

9
1
9

10
-

Loop 7: Investigator i = 1; assigned time t∗71 =10, since b7 ≤ 19 and update T =
9.
Loop 8: Since b8 > a8 > T , we enter Step 3.
Step 3. Using the condition ae − T ≤ 0 and be > 0, we construct the set δ = [9, 10]
and enter Step 4.
Step 4. Now, we calculate E9 = max[9, 5]∗ 8 = 72 and E10 = max[9, 8]∗ 7 = 63; hence,
we fix k as 9 since E9 > E10 . Set investigator i = 1; assigned time t∗91 =max[9,5],
and update T = 0.
Step 5. We proceed to Step 6 since T = 0 is satisfied. Table 2.3 illustrates the
assignments described above by adopting Steps 2 through 5.
Step 6. We calculate E ∗ = 71*25 + 15*23 + 33*22 + 86*20 + 49*16 + 30*15 +
10*13 + 9*8 = 6002 and STOP.
Output. Total effectiveness E ∗ = 6002 is the best solution found by Algorithm M.
The solution above turned out to be non-optimal corresponding to an optimal
solution of 6127 as verified by solving the corresponding MILP using AIMMS version
3.13.
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2.6

Conclusion
This chapter considered and presented the importance of CSI in digital foren-

sics. Further, we classified and described the sequential and parallel examination
procedure for evidences acquired from a digital crime scene. In the absence of any
significant analytical models for CSI especially pertaining to solving digital crime,
we presented MILP models to maximize the overall effectiveness of a sequential digital forensic investigation procedure involving single and multiple investigators. Since
the proposed general problems are NP-hard, two heuristic algorithms for the single investigator case and one heuristic algorithm for the multiple investigator case
were presented to solve the general problem in finding an optimal or near-optimal
solution. While the sequential digital forensic investigation models presented help in
solving a digital crime, it will be useful to detect and proactively prevent the network
fraud. The next chapter deals with the development of an analytical model to help
in detecting the intrusion into a computer or network system.
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CHAPTER 3

INVESTIGATION OF IDS ALARMS WITH LIMITED RESOURCES

An intrusion detection system (IDS) assists the system administrator to prevent attacks and to react with defensive mechanisms when such an attack is detected.
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of a system, IDS aims to provide enhanced
security, thus not allowing any normal operations to be interrupted accidentally or
maliciously. However, “being one of the responsible element for establishing and
maintaining security in an organization, IDS is becoming a richer target for most experienced attackers in recent years [59].”This chapter describes a model and presents
a solution to the IDS alarm investigation problem with limited resources. Specifically,
the proposed techniques helps an IDS administrator to make an optimal decision in
choosing what alarms to investigate and in which sequence they should be investigated, thereby minimizing the total expected cost incurred by a firm.

3.1

Overview of Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
Intrusions are caused by attackers who are trying to gain privileges of a com-

puter or network via the Internet or gain unauthorized access by compromising administrator/system credentials. Intrusions are the events that contravene the security
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policy of the system. Whether the intention is to gain access in order to achieve a possible compromise or make a system unavailable or just to gather information, there
is no distinction concerning the intent. Intrusions have the characteristic of being
detectable based on the belief that normal or legitimate user activity is noticeably
distinguishable from an intruder’s behavior [60].
Intruders are generally classified into two groups, external intruders, who do
not have any authorized access to the system they attack, and internal intruders, who
have limited authorized access to that system [61]. Internal intruders can be further
subdivided into the following three categories: (1) masqueraders (external intruders)
who have succeeded in gaining access to the system and are acting as an authorized
entity; (2) legitimate intruders who have access to both the system and the data
but misuse this access (misfeasors); and (3) clandestine intruders who have obtained
supervisory (root) control of the system and as such can either operate below the level
of auditing or can use the privileges to avoid being audited by stopping, modifying,
or erasing the audit records [62].
IDS is an important component of defensive measures protecting computer and
network systems from abuse [63]. It can be well compared with a simple burglar alarm
to explain its functionality. For instance, a burglar or an automated alarm installed
in a house protects it from breakage or theft by raising an alarm or sending an alert
message notifying the house owner. In a similar way, an IDS protects the network or
a system by raising alarms or by sending alerts to an administrator. Further, an IDS
complements the firewalls by providing an additional layer of protection in an organization’s security layout or plan. While firewall could protect an organization from
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malicious attacks, an IDS supplements it by detecting any potential breakthrough
into the overall security of the firewall, thereby improving the entire security of the
system or network. An IDS could actively monitor and detect any attack on the
untrusted as well as trusted sites of the system or network and instantly send an
alert to an administrator if there is even a slight breach in an organization’s security
implementation. For these reasons, IDSs are known as the watchdogs of information
systems [62].
IDSs are available in configurations as simple as open source software and as
complicated as necessary to protect large enterprise networks. Because of the variation
in IDS needs and the budgets available for IDS deployment, there are a wide variety of
IDS solutions available for IT managers to employ. This variation introduces a level
of complexity in selecting the appropriate type of the IDS for a particular network.
Variations include IDS-specific concerns such as placement on the network, technique
used to detect intrusion, and the availability of full time support. Cost is a significant
driver for many components of the IDS, but it is not the only concern.
To defend modern networks from the increasing number of attacks made by
hackers and from potential internal sabotage, network administrators employ IDS as
a part of a holistic information security plan. An IDS can be as complicated or simple
as required, but the IDS technology by itself is constantly changing and improving.
A review of IDS technology, its history, and its effectiveness makes it clear that
all network administrators should use an IDS for achieving overall effectiveness in
information security. As stated by Bahrami [64], intrusion detection has been an
active field of research for about two decades, starting in 1980 with the publication of
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Anderson′ s Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance [65], which was
one of the earliest papers in the field.
As stated earlier, an IDS can be a software or a hardware system that has
an ability to continuously monitor the computer or network systems for any possible
intrusion and raise an alert/alarm when such an intrusion occurs. They are usually
deployed as stand-alone software/hardware or in combination with other preventative
mechanisms, such as access controls and firewalls. The main reasons that make an
IDS a mandatory part of any information security system are [66, 67]:
• Most of the traditional systems and applications were developed without considering security in mind. As a result, they work specific to an environment
and are vulnerable to a wide variety of platform-independent attacks. In most
cases, systems are secure when isolated but become vulnerable to attacks when
connected to the Internet. When IDSs are allowed to run over a period of time,
patterns of system usage and security flaws can become apparent, thus providing a way to identify new attacks and correct deficiencies in the security system
before the attacks could be initiated.
• The vulnerabilities1 for a system are not properly addressed during its implementation, allowing it to attract more threats. There are many situations
enabling this scenario [68]:
– The operating systems are not updated and patched regularly with updates.
1

As addressed by the requirements of public services such as ICAT, http://icat.nist.gov.
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– Users in a network can have compelling operational requirements for applications and protocols that are known to be vulnerable to attacks.
– Insider threats and human errors also play significant roles in causing configuration and testing errors.
– While configuring a system access control to reflect an organization’s security policy, discrepancies always occur. These disparities allow a legitimate
user to easily bypass his authorization levels.
Accounting all these situations, an IDS can be an excellent approach to protecting a system. Further, an IDS can serve as an important unit in system
protection by carefully coordinating with the administrator to recover from attacks.
• Due to limitations in designing secure software and hardware, computer and
network systems might contain architectural flaws or bugs that could be easily capitalized by an attacker for intruding a system or its relevant applications [69]. As a result, the first line of defense mechanisms may fail to prevent
the attack [68]. An IDS can effectively complement the first protective line of
measures such as firewalls to improve the overall security architecture of the
system. Moreover, an IDS also helps in learning more about the intrusions,
thus providing an opportunity to better understand the threats and risks and
to be proactive toward future attacks.
The configuration and maintenance also play significant roles in deciding the
overall performance of an IDS. When an IDS is properly configured and deployed,
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Figure 3.1: A general architectural representation of an IDS [61]

it can issue warnings against an attack for which the system might not be currently
vulnerable. The administrator can then amend the configuration settings based on
the warnings to further increase the system’s resistance to an attack. In some cases,
an IDS might also help confirming secure configuration and operation of other dependable security mechanisms such as firewalls [70].
Many IDSs have been proposed and developed for both commercial and research purposes since the first real working model was developed by Dorothy and
Denning [71] in 1987. Most IDSs are extremely diverse in the techniques that they
employ to record and analyze data; however, most of them adapt to a relatively
general architectural framework. Figure 3.1 shows a common architectural implementation of an IDS system [61, 68].
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• Sensors: A sensor or data gathering device plays the foremost role in any IDS. It
is responsible for real-time monitoring and collection of information from hosts
or networks. In some systems, it may also be referred to as an event generator
whose purpose is to obtain events from the large computational environments
outside the IDS. Event generators must have the capability of reporting events
as soon as they occur.
• Detector: A detector often called the analysis engine is responsible for detecting
and classifying intrusions based on the data collected from the sensors.
• Knowledge Base: A knowledge database is generally a huge repository or a
database containing data in preprocessed formats. It often contains information
about various known attack patterns and is usually provided or written by
security professionals or experts.
• Response Unit: Response component generates or initiates an action in the
event of an ongoing or detected intrusion. These responses can vary among IDSs
depending upon its configuration and capability. The nature of responses can
be automated (which does not involve human support) or inactive (which needs
human involvement). Automated actions includes killing active user/system
services, altering file permissions, resetting connections to servers, etc., whereas
an inactive action notifies a system administrator to take further action.
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3.2

Active and Passive Response of an IDS
Upon obtaining and gathering all information about the incoming intrusions

or attacks, the main functionality of an IDS is to respond to these attacks. Only few
researchers have worked to study the importance of good response functions of an
IDS [68, 72]. One way of classifying IDS is based upon its type of response initiated
upon encountering an incoming attack. Two types of response options of an IDS are:
• Active Response: In an active IDS, responsive action is automatically triggered
whenever an alarm is raised for an intrusive event or activity. The nature of
responsive action varies depending upon the type and severity of the attack.
An active IDS is also popularly known as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
This response is often productive as it collects additional information about a
suspected attack. Active response can continuously halt an attack by blocking
the attacker’s incoming traffic; however, an active IDS may be bypassed in some
situations.
• Passive Response: Passive IDS responses provide information to system administrators, relying on humans to take subsequent action based on that information. Many commercial IDSs rely solely on passive responses [74]. In contrast
to an active IDS, a passive IDS does not initiate any response to the alarm
but notifies any system administrator or someone else who will be able to take
appropriate actions to halt the attack and possibly trace the intruder. These
notifications are normally sent to cell phones, pagers or simply to the administrator’s e-mail inbox. Active IDS has the ability to provide rapid corrective
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action but if not properly configured, can raise a large number of false positives,
thus denying access to legitimate users. On the other hand, passive IDS can be
easily managed, deployed and do not normally attack themselves. Therefore,
the administrator makes sure that the suspicious activity is malicious before
actually disconnecting the connection to the network.

3.3

Investigation of Passive IDS Alarms
False positive alarms are normally prevalent in IDS [62], since the benign events

outnumber the malicious ones. The role of a security analyst or administrator is to
decide and investigate alarms to distinguish benign from malicious events. Overall,
the process of investigating IDS alarms is time-consuming process, taking into account
the number of false positives being generated. Further, it increases the workload of a
security administrator whose capacity and provided resources are limited [73].
The process of investigating the alarms plays an important role in using passive
IDS. The main reasons are:
(1) The process of investigation takes time, and if the suspicious traffic turns out to
be malicious, then the damage to the firm increases with the delay associated
with the start and completion of the investigation process.
(2) The resources available for conducting such investigations are often limited. For
example, if the total investigation time available is limited, some IDS alarm investigation may be delayed or not even investigated, and in the case of false positives
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the service is shut-off, thus incurring the risk of shutting down legitimate network
traffic.
(3) The time spent by administrators on investigating IDS alarms is significantly
longer than the time that IDS spends in monitoring and analyzing the incoming
events [73].
Figure 3.2 represents a model for investigating passive IDS alarms. This proposed model focuses on investigating a set of alarms triggered by a passive IDS. Upon
investigation, the model generates alarm sets which need to either be selected and
rejected for analysis by a security administrator or be ignored. In this model, alarms
are not formally analyzed until an investigation decision is made. Therefore, greater
investigation effectiveness is required to ensure timely investigation of alarms.

3.3.1

Prior Works
Denning [71] presented a model for real-time intrusion detection early in 1987.

This model attempts to detect a wide range of security violations ranging from attempted break-ins by outsiders to system penetrations and abuses by insiders. In this
model, a hypothesis is defined to detect security violations by monitoring system’s
audit records for abnormal patterns of system usage. The important objective for any
current research work in the field of IDSs as highlighted in this work is to determine
what activities and statistical measures provide the best discriminating power to have
a high rate of detections and a low rate of false alarms. Axelsson [62] illustrated the
base-rate fallacy phenomenon in IDSs. In this work, the author outlined the efficiency
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Figure 3.2: A passive IDS alarm investigation model
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of an IDS as the measure of detection capability of substantial percentage of intrusions into the supervised system, while keeping the false alarm rate at an acceptable
level. Further, this work also proves that in order to achieve substantial amount of
Bayesian detection rate [62], low levels of false alarm rates should be achieved. Axelsson [60, 67] also presented a more in-depth review of IDSs, its related concepts,
taxonomy and survey of research in IDS.
A multi-attribute decisional framework system for network intrusion detection
was developed by Fessi et al. [74]. Initially, a cost model is presented that allows
to estimate the damage resulting from security incidents. Following this, a multiattribute optimization algorithm is presented to select an optimal decision based
on alternatives to remedy such incidents. This approach works the best in IDSs
where the decision taken by an IDS is supported and assisted by human experts.
Ulvila and Gaffney [75] presented a decision analysis model for evaluating computer
IDS. This methodology proves that the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic)
analysis and cost-benefit analysis methods are incomplete and it shows a decision tree
approach which extends the ROC and cost analysis methods to provide an expected
cost metric that reflects the IDS′ s ROC curve, costs, and assessments of the hostility
of the environment as summarized by the prior probability of intrusions. Further,
this approach shows how this method can be used to decide the optimal operating
point on an IDS′ s ROC curve.
Cavusoglu et al. [76] illustrated a framework which seeks to assess the value
of IDSs in a firm’s security architecture. The detection (true positive) and false
alarm (false positive) rates are used to determine whether a firm realizes a positive or
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negative value from the IDS. Also, the authors showed that a firm realizes a positive
value from an IDS only when the detection rate is higher than a critical value derived
based on a hacker’s benefit and cost parameters. Lee et al. [77] presented a costsensitive model for intrusion detection and response. The main focus of this approach
is to maximize the realization of security goals while minimizing the costs incurred
by a firm. The major cost factors that are taken into account are development costs,
operational costs, damage costs incurred due to intrusions, and the costs involved in
responding to intrusions. Julisch [78] proposed a model which illustrated root-cause
analysis for IDS alarms. This author presents a novel approach by identifying the
persistent and predominant root causes for each type of alarms raised by an IDS.
This model further proves that the alarm load significantly decreases if the identified
root causes are eliminated, so they no longer trigger alarms in the future.
Yue and Cakanyildirim [79] presented a model for two important managerial decisions involved in the intrusion prevention process; the configuration of the
detection component and the response by the reaction component. Unlike the previous researchers who presented static models, the authors presented an optimization
approach for jointly optimizing two decision variables signifying the detection and
reaction components of an IPS. The choice of an optimal mixture of reactive and
proactive variables is shown to be dependent on the values of cost parameters and
investigation rate parameters. The authors presented a research that studied the
joint decisions of IDS configurations and alarm investigation capacity under active
and passive responses [73]. This work illustrated a formulae for the optimal investigation capacity and also showed that the optimal configuration under active response is
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smaller than that under passive response. Further, the authors provided expressions
for evaluating security costs and benefits under various configuration, capacities and
responses. A multi-period optimization model for analyzing an IDS decision in the
presence of multiple alarm types, which differ in occurrence probabilities, damage
and investigation costs, was presented by Yue et al. [80]. This model studied three
critical decisions associated with intrusion detection: (a) allocation of the investigation budget to different periods and to different alarm types; (b) configuration of an
IDS, i.e., choosing a false alarm rate for a given IDS; and (c) allocation of an appropriate amount of the investigation budget in the presence of alternative investment
opportunities.
A model for investigating the problem of false alarms based on popular open
source network IDS software Snort was presented by Tjhai et al. [81]. This work
showed a number of potential issues faced by an IDS monitoring real-time network
traffic and evaluated its performance under these issues. Cabrera et al. [82] developed
optimization and control problem formulations involving knapsack and set packing
constraints to represent real-time intrusion detection. This work described a collection of integer linear programming problems that are associated with the selection of
appropriate rule portfolios for intrusion detection. Also, to overcome the inherent uncertainty of the parameters in the cost models, a robust version of the same problem
was presented addressing the parametric uncertainties. A semi-supervised decision
theoretic model was developed by Lane [83] for intrusion detection. The main highlight of this model is its attempt to combine misuse detection with anomaly detection
while exploiting the strengths of both. This model also opens up a novel research of
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IDS models and allows precise quantification of the computational expense of optimal
decision making for specific IDS variants and cost functions.

3.3.2

Problem Formulation and Complexity
Out of the widely known performance evaluation measures for an IDS, effec-

tiveness is the top-priority concern among researchers. As stated by Axelsson [62],
there are different dimensions of effectiveness relating to an IDS, which basically answers the question “How effective is an IDS.”One important dimension is its ability
to decide the right set of alarms to be considered for investigation. Additional parameters that must be taken into account in this dimension are the cost incurred by a
firm in investigating the selected alarms and the time taken by an IDS for the entire
investigation. It is impractical to investigate all the alarms in a queue, as the time and
resources available for investigation is usually limited and excessive damages could be
caused by delaying the investigation of alarms associated with malicious events. We
address the effectiveness by modeling the passive IDS alarm investigation problem.
In this research, we consider the problem of allocating limited resources to
investigate a given number of IDS alarms that are queued, to minimize total cost [84].
The problem is formulated mathematically with the main objective to decide which
alarms needs to be investigated and in what sequence they should be investigated so
that the total cost incurred by the firm is minimal. To simplify the presentation, we
consider the case involving a single investigator though our analysis can be extended
to cover multiple investigators. Further, computational complexity of the problem
and efficient heuristic algorithms to solve the problem are proposed and developed.
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Consider the following scenario: a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n IDS alarms are
received at time zero to be investigated by a single security expert who has a total
available time of T time units. The severity of each alarm i ∈ N is si and the value of
the corresponding customer or activity for which IDS issues an alarm is Vi . The cost
of investigating alarm i is cβi si , while the time taken to investigate alarm i is ti = αi si .
The loss in value due to the delay in investigating an alarm is δi fi where fi is the
finish time of investigating alarm i. Associated with investigative effort for alarm i
is the probability pi that investigation will reveal that the alarm is false. Given the
above scenario, it is desired to (a) determine which alarms should be investigated,
and (b) in what sequence each alarm should be investigated.
From the above problem description, it is clear that if alarm i is not investigated and the connection is shut-off, the loss of value is vi = pi Vi . On the other hand,
if alarm i is investigated, we could write the total cost Ci of investigating an alarm
as follows:

Ci = cβi si + (1 − pi )δi fi

(3.1)

Thus, a blocked benign event costs Ci per unit time during its investigation which
in turn can be considered a penalty incurred for delaying service to a non-intrusive
event that raised the alarm. To simplify the notation, for each alarm i, we define
Ki = cβi si and wi = [(1 − pi )]δi fi .
Given the above situation, we want to select the alarms to investigate and to
find the order in which we should investigate the selected alarms so that the total
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Figure 3.3: Investigation decision subsets

investigation cost is minimum. In order to formulate and solve this problem, we first
assume that alarms are divided into two subsets, where subset A denotes the alarms
which are investigated and subset B denotes the alarms that are not investigated.
The total expected cost of alarms in subset A, therefore, can be written as:

CA =

X

[Ki ] +

i∈A

X

[wi fi ]

(3.2)

i∈A

Figure 3.3 illustrates the subsets generated upon investigating the IDS alarms.
Since the term
imizing

P

i∈A [wi fi ]

P

i∈A [Ki ]

is constant for a given subset A, it follows that min-

will minimize CA . However, this problem is equivalent to solving

the single machine-weighted flow time problem which can be solved by arranging the
jobs (alarms) in descending order of weight-to-time ratio [85] (i.e., for any two alarms
i and j, alarm i precedes alarm j if wi /ti ≥ wj /tj ). Therefore, the problem of se-
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quencing the alarms, once it is decided which alarms to investigate, is polynomially
solvable in O(n log n) computational effort. However, as shown below, the problem
considered in this section is NP-hard in the ordinary sense.
Theorem 3.1. The IDS alarm investigation problem with resource constraints is
NP-hard in the ordinary sense.
Proof. Consider a special case of the IDS alarm investigation problem with the total
time constrained to T where for each alarm i ∈ N , Ki = vi = 0. Then, the problem considered above is a single machine-scheduling problem where it is desired to
minimize the sum of weighted completion times subject to the constraint that the
completion time of selected jobs (alarms) be no more than T . This is a 2-partition
problem where jobs need to be divided into two subsets: jobs that are selected and
jobs that are rejected. Since the 2-partition problem is known to be NP-hard in
the ordinary sense, it follows that the general IDS alarm investigation problem with
resource constraints is NP-hard in the ordinary sense [53].



While Theorem 3.1 shows that the IDS alarm investigation problem with resource constraints is NP-hard in the ordinary sense, its status as to its NP-hardness
in the strong sense still remains open.
Now, to formulate the original problem, we assume that the alarms are numbered in a descending order of their weight-to-time ratio (i.e., for any two alarms i
and j, alarm i precedes alarm j if wi /ti ≥ wj /tj ). Let Xi be a binary variable that
takes on a value of 1 if it is included to be evaluated and 0 otherwise. Then, the
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mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model of the above problem is as follows:

min

Z=

n
X

[Xi Ki + wi (fi − (1 − Xi )(T + ti )) + (1 − Xi )vi ]

(3.3)

i=1

subject to:

fi ≥

i
X

Xr tr

∀i ∈ N

(3.4)

fi − (T + ti ) + Xi (T + ti ) ≥ 0

∀i ∈ N

(3.5)

fi ≤ (T + ti )

∀i ∈ N

(3.6)

r=1

n
X

Xi ti ≤ T

(3.7)

i=1

where Xi is binary (0, 1) and T is the total time available to investigate the given
alarms.
Equation (3.3) represents the total expected cost to be minimized which reduces to Equation (3.2) for the selected investigations. Constraint set (3.4) finds the
time of completion of investigating alarm i while constraint sets (3.5) and (3.6) ensure
that any alarm i, which is not selected for investigation, has a completion time equal
to T + ti . Finally, constraint (3.7) ensures that the total time of all alarms to be
investigated is no greater than the total available time.
The above formulation of the IDS alarm problem contains n integer (0, 1)
variables, n continuous variables, and 3n constraints. While the size of this MILP
problem is quite reasonable, it is still NP-hard in the ordinary sense.
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3.3.3

A Greedy Heuristic Algorithm
Since the IDS alarm problem is NP-hard at least in the ordinary sense, we

propose a greedy approach based algorithm to find an approximate solution to the
problem. This is based on the fact that we know the sequence of alarms to be
investigated. Further, we can decrease the problem size by noticing the trade-offs
between the investigation cost and the loss due to non-investigation of an alarm.
Thus, an alarm i should not be investigated if wi ti ≥ vi . In our algorithm below, we
assume that this reduction in problem size has already been accomplished.
In our first heuristic algorithm, we continue to investigate the alarms so long
as the time is available to do so. We do so in a greedy manner, i.e., we select the alarm
to be investigated in a greedy sequence (in the descending order of the weight-to-time
ratio). The steps of such an algorithm are as follows:
Algorithm G: A Greedy Algorithm
Step 0. Let the set of alarms be N = (1, 2, . . . , n) where for each alarm i ≤ (n − 1),
wi /ti ≥ wi+1 /ti+1 , Set A = B = ∅. Set fi = Xi = 0 for all i ≤ n. Let F = 0 and
i = 1.
Step 1. If F + ti ≤ T , enter Step 2; otherwise, enter Step 3.
Step 2. If Ki + wi fi < vi , set F = F + ti , fi = F , A = (A, i), and Xi = 1. Proceed to
Step 3.
Step 3. If i = n, proceed to Step 4; otherwise, set i = i + 1 and return to Step 1.
Step 4. Stop: calculate total cost Z ∗ =

Pn

i=1 [Xi (Ki

+ wi fi ) + (1 − Xi )vi ]. Let the

set B = N − \A. The alarms in set A are investigated while alarms in set B are
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not. Z ∗ is the best total cost, and fi is the finish time for each selected alarm as
found by Algorithm G.
The Algorithm G above has a computational complexity of O(n) for Steps 1-4.
It also requires an additional O(nlogn) computational effort for the initial ordering
of wi /ti , as processed in Step 0.

3.4

Conclusion
This chapter presented a MILP model that focuses on investigating a set of

alarms triggered by a passive IDS with limited resources. We proposed an efficient
linear heuristic algorithm to solve the general problem in choosing which IDS alarms
need to be investigated and in what sequence they need to be investigated. The
next chapter will illustrate our design of computational experiments in empirically
evaluating the effectiveness of sequential digital forensic investigation model with
single and multiple investigators and the passive IDS alarm investigation model in
finding an optimal or near-optimal solution to the proposed general problems.
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CHAPTER 4

COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

In this chapter, we design and develop experimental procedures to determine
the efficiency of the proposed heuristic algorithms in Sections 2.4.4, 2.5.5, and 3.3.3
finding an optimal or near-optimal solution to the general problems. While these
problems are NP-hard, we define various performance metrics to ascertain the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithms. It would be ideal to test the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithms using real-time data but unfortunately, our
search for obtaining them was unsuccessful.
In view of this, our computational experiments were generated randomly using
various uniform distributions of data. Use of these randomly generated problem instances is justified, since it has been shown that these problem instances are relatively
harder to solve than real-life combinatorial and scheduling problem instances [86]. For
empirically evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency, the proposed algorithms were
coded in Visual C++ and the computational experiments were executed on a PC
with Intel Core i3 CPU running at 1.80 GHz. The optimal solution for each problem
instance was verified using AIMMS optimization software version 3.131 .The impli1

The solver used for optimization is CPLEX optimizer version 12.5.
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cations of these computational experiments and results for testing the efficiency of
algorithms are discussed in the following sections.

4.1

Sequential Digital Forensic Problem with Single Investigator
We describe the computational experiments used to evaluate and compare the

effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithms in optimally solving the sequential
digital forensic problem involving a single investigator considered under Section 2.4.1.

4.1.1

Parameters for Problem Instances
The experimental parameters were the number of evidences n, the minimum

and maximum times ai and bi , respectively, effectiveness rate βi for each evidence
i ∈ N , and the total available investigation time T . The number of evidences in
the experimental parameters for problem instances varied from 10 through 100 in
increments of 10. Problem hardness is likely to depend on the values and ranges
of the parameters of the problem instance: the rate of the evidence effectiveness βi ,
the minimum and maximum investigation times ai and bi , respectively, and the total
time available for investigation T . Therefore, we generated the following six classes
of problem instances by varying the ranges of problem parameters βi , ai and bi as
follows.
• Class 1: βi , ai , and bi were generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99).
• Class 2: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 49) and ai , bi were
generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99).
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• Class 3: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99) and ai , bi were
generated from a uniform distribution U (50, 99).
• Class 4: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 49) and ai , bi were
generated from a uniform distribution U (50, 99).
• Class 5: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99), ai was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99) and bi was generated from a uniform
distribution U (50, 99).
• Class 6: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 49), ai was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99) and bi was generated from a uniform
distribution U (50, 99).
In addition, to test the impact of the total available time in finding an optimal
solution, we set T = α

Pn

i=1 bi

where α = 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9. For each combination

of ai , bi , βi and n values, 25 problem instances were generated, because they are
sufficient to produce steady state empirical results for the measures of performance of
various algorithms. Thus, our computational experiment consisted of solving a total
of 4,500 (10*25*6*3) problem instances.

4.1.2

Algorithm Effectiveness
To assess the effectiveness of Algorithm P in relation to Algorithm T, we

solved each problem instance using the proposed heuristic algorithms P and T. We
also found the optimal solution to each problem instance by solving its corresponding
MILP problem P using the AIMMS optimization software.
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To find the effectiveness of the Algorithm P and T, we calculated the average
percent relative deviation (APRD) defined as follows:
1 X
EA − EH
AP RDH =
100 ∗
,
25 i=1
EA
25

(4.1)

where EH and EA are the total effectiveness values found by using heuristic Algorithm
H and AIMMS software, respectively. The smaller the value of AP RDH , the better
the performance of the Algorithm H.
Tables 4.1 through 4.6 show the AP RDH values for each heuristic algorithm
H ∈ (P, T ) and for each of the six categories of problem instances. These results are
summarized in Table 4.7. The computational performance measures used in these
tables are defined as below:
• OPT = Total Number of Optimal Solutions of 25 instances
• % Deviation = 100.00*[Optimal solution - Heuristic solution] / [Optimal solution]
• Min = Minimum % Deviation of 25 instances
• Avg = Average % Deviation of 25 instances =

P25

i=1

[% Deviation]/25

• Max = Maximum % Deviation of 25 instances

These detailed and summary results show that the proposed Algorithm P
performed better than Algorithm T for all six categories when measured in terms
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Table 4.1: Computational results with ai , bi ∈ U (1, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

n

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
24
0.00 0.13 3.33
23
0.00 0.05 1.21
23
0.00 0.04 0.71
22
0.00 0.02 0.32
24
0.00 0.01 0.27
23
0.00 0.01 0.13
21
0.00 0.04 0.48
23
0.00 0.01 0.16
23
0.00 0.01 0.16
22
0.00 0.01 0.11
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
22
0.00 0.01 0.13
21
0.00 0.00 0.04
24
0.00 0.01 0.26
24
0.00 0.00 0.04
23
0.00 0.00 0.02
24
0.00 0.00 0.03
24
0.00 0.00 0.02
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
22
0.00 0.01 0.11
23
0.00 0.00 0.05
23
0.00 0.00 0.08
23
0.00 0.00 0.01
24
0.00 0.00 0.01
24
0.00 0.00 0.02
24
0.00 0.00 0.06
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
24
0.00 0.00 0.02
701 0.00 0.00 3.33
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Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
15
0.00 9.47 64.26
12
0.00 7.16 42.73
16
0.00 0.63 4.96
13
0.00 7.01 51.92
11
0.00 1.47 8.00
13
0.00 0.39 1.78
10
0.00 2.17 8.82
10
0.00 0.92 4.70
11
0.00 0.21 1.84
13
0.00 1.47 8.61
10
0.00 1.15 5.52
17
0.00 0.25 1.83
10
0.00 1.37 5.49
13
0.00 0.33 1.88
10
0.00 0.36 3.06
12
0.00 1.17 3.87
17
0.00 0.21 1.19
12
0.00 0.22 1.55
15
0.00 0.83 3.60
13
0.00 0.31 1.83
17
0.00 0.06 0.38
10
0.00 0.77 2.56
15
0.00 0.22 1.27
14
0.00 0.07 0.48
11
0.00 0.55 2.18
15
0.00 0.17 1.30
15
0.00 0.05 0.35
14
0.00 0.41 2.97
13
0.00 0.17 0.92
13
0.00 0.08 0.36
390 0.00 1.32 64.26

Table 4.2: Computational results with ai , bi ∈ U (1, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 49)

n

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
23
0.00 0.09 1.45
24
0.00 0.00 0.08
24
0.00 0.03 0.83
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
23
0.00 0.02 0.29
24
0.00 0.00 0.12
24
0.00 0.03 0.69
22
0.00 0.03 0.59
22
0.00 0.01 0.09
23
0.00 0.00 0.05
23
0.00 0.01 0.15
23
0.00 0.01 0.10
23
0.00 0.00 0.05
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
24
0.00 0.00 0.04
23
0.00 0.01 0.24
24
0.00 0.00 0.04
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
22
0.00 0.02 0.19
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
24
0.00 0.00 0.01
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
24
0.00 0.00 0.09
23
0.00 0.00 0.05
24
0.00 0.00 0.01
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
23
0.00 0.00 0.07
24
0.00 0.00 0.03
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
707 0.00 0.01 1.45
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Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
14
0.00 4.27 14.96
18
0.00 0.30 3.83
16
0.00 0.81 4.63
10
0.00 3.16 12.18
11
0.00 1.33 6.88
15
0.00 0.29 1.52
10
0.00 2.06 8.23
10
0.00 0.86 4.15
11
0.00 0.19 1.29
13
0.00 1.44 8.19
13
0.00 0.32 1.46
14
0.00 0.18 1.23
14
0.00 0.94 7.40
11
0.00 0.34 2.09
16
0.00 0.11 0.71
13
0.00 1.20 7.86
15
0.00 0.25 2.01
12
0.00 0.14 0.86
12
0.00 0.78 3.38
17
0.00 0.27 1.74
15
0.00 0.08 0.35
14
0.00 0.68 4.57
14
0.00 0.18 1.07
16
0.00 0.12 0.85
11
0.00 0.55 2.02
15
0.00 0.17 1.48
15
0.00 0.05 0.40
14
0.00 0.41 2.76
13
0.00 0.17 0.89
13
0.00 0.08 0.31
405 0.00 0.72 14.96

Table 4.3: Computational results with ai , bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

n

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
23
0.00 0.59 9.21
19
0.00 0.78 7.68
20
0.00 0.20 2.74
11
0.00 1.25 8.56
17
0.00 0.54 4.03
14
0.00 0.45 2.18
13
0.00 1.08 5.28
11
0.00 0.45 1.85
12
0.00 0.25 1.16
16
0.00 0.58 3.46
14
0.00 0.22 1.92
11
0.00 0.16 0.81
12
0.00 0.37 3.45
13
0.00 0.20 1.26
15
0.00 0.10 0.78
6
0.00 0.55 2.92
15
0.00 0.15 1.08
13
0.00 0.15 1.10
13
0.00 0.40 2.12
12
0.00 0.14 0.89
11
0.00 0.09 0.48
12
0.00 0.30 1.32
14
0.00 0.11 0.61
11
0.00 0.04 0.20
16
0.00 0.34 2.11
16
0.00 0.06 0.59
13
0.00 0.03 0.15
13
0.00 0.30 1.29
8
0.00 0.13 0.62
14
0.00 0.05 0.26
408 0.00 0.34 9.21
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Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
11
0.00 12.91 45.50
12
0.00 5.83 33.75
12
0.00 2.71 20.24
4
0.00 6.13 18.82
6
0.00 2.95 10.32
8
0.00 0.98 3.27
7
0.00 4.18 9.82
6
0.00 1.32 4.78
11
0.00 0.34 1.88
5
0.00 3.19 7.55
8
0.00 1.45 6.03
4
0.00 0.48 1.49
5
0.00 2.23 6.18
5
0.00 0.78 2.64
9
0.00 0.42 2.05
4
0.00 1.48 4.93
7
0.00 0.49 1.84
8
0.00 0.35 1.56
6
0.00 1.61 4.14
8
0.00 0.55 2.19
8
0.00 0.23 0.90
7
0.00 0.99 2.95
7
0.00 0.45 1.32
7
0.00 0.18 1.02
10
0.00 1.12 3.26
7
0.00 0.41 1.10
9
0.00 0.13 0.45
8
0.00 0.73 2.35
3
0.00 0.34 0.99
9
0.00 0.12 0.31
221 0.00 1.84 45.50

Table 4.4: Computational results with ai , bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 49)

n

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
19
0.00 3.29 23.03
21
0.00 0.40 5.62
11
0.00 0.86 5.25
15
0.00 1.27 9.01
19
0.00 0.50 3.89
12
0.00 0.31 2.06
12
0.00 1.02 5.28
15
0.00 0.17 1.85
11
0.00 0.23 1.24
13
0.00 0.54 3.33
13
0.00 0.26 1.83
13
0.00 0.16 0.70
9
0.00 0.69 2.28
12
0.00 0.23 1.17
12
0.00 0.15 0.86
8
0.00 0.55 2.22
15
0.00 0.13 0.94
12
0.00 0.15 1.13
12
0.00 0.57 2.46
11
0.00 0.11 0.82
12
0.00 0.14 1.14
14
0.00 0.35 1.67
11
0.00 0.13 0.52
17
0.00 0.04 0.22
15
0.00 0.33 2.06
16
0.00 0.06 0.62
14
0.00 0.03 0.11
13
0.00 0.30 1.45
7
0.00 0.14 0.60
15
0.00 0.05 0.36
399 0.00 0.44 23.03
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Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
10
0.00 14.30 42.16
13
0.00 3.76 20.10
7
0.00 1.40 5.25
6
0.00 6.32 18.04
6
0.00 2.87 8.09
6
0.00 0.81 2.73
6
0.00 4.11 9.69
6
0.00 1.32 4.78
11
0.00 0.34 1.67
3
0.00 2.93 8.71
6
0.00 1.44 6.03
6
0.00 0.52 1.47
7
0.00 1.40 6.37
5
0.00 0.83 2.33
6
0.00 0.79 2.62
6
0.00 1.46 4.72
7
0.00 0.50 1.93
6
0.00 0.36 1.55
7
0.00 1.42 3.82
7
0.00 0.53 1.92
8
0.00 0.68 4.73
7
0.00 1.07 3.24
7
0.00 0.42 1.36
10
0.00 0.19 0.86
9
0.00 1.12 3.07
6
0.00 0.41 1.14
8
0.00 0.15 0.63
8
0.00 0.74 2.60
2
0.00 0.37 1.14
9
0.00 0.12 0.36
216 0.00 1.74 42.16

Table 4.5: Computational results with ai ∈ U (1, 99), bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

n

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
24
0.00 0.00 0.11
21
0.00 0.27 3.57
23
0.00 0.13 2.49
24
0.00 0.01 0.37
24
0.00 0.02 0.43
23
0.00 0.01 0.16
23
0.00 0.01 0.24
22
0.00 0.03 0.30
22
0.00 0.03 0.35
21
0.00 0.03 0.39
22
0.00 0.01 0.26
24
0.00 0.00 0.09
22
0.00 0.01 0.16
24
0.00 0.00 0.05
20
0.00 0.02 0.14
21
0.00 0.02 0.23
20
0.00 0.03 0.28
24
0.00 0.00 0.06
24
0.00 0.00 0.02
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
23
0.00 0.00 0.11
24
0.00 0.00 0.03
20
0.00 0.01 0.06
21
0.00 0.00 0.01
21
0.00 0.00 0.04
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
23
0.00 0.00 0.05
22
0.00 0.01 0.08
23
0.00 0.00 0.00
22
0.00 0.00 0.06
673 0.00 0.02 3.57
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Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
11
0.00 10.99 35.78
10
0.00 4.97 29.59
18
0.00 0.51 5.18
9
0.00 4.42 20.54
11
0.00 1.79 8.09
9
0.00 0.75 3.17
12
0.00 1.94 10.76
9
0.00 0.91 2.91
11
0.00 0.35 1.80
10
0.00 1.94 7.72
7
0.00 0.74 2.61
8
0.00 0.66 2.73
13
0.00 1.21 7.02
9
0.00 0.60 2.11
12
0.00 0.56 3.11
7
0.00 1.07 4.34
7
0.00 0.49 1.50
13
0.00 0.33 1.96
12
0.00 0.50 2.94
10
0.00 0.42 1.20
12
0.00 0.52 2.60
8
0.00 0.88 2.25
11
0.00 0.23 1.36
10
0.00 0.16 0.79
6
0.00 0.96 2.95
17
0.00 0.10 0.57
12
0.00 0.10 0.44
12
0.00 0.72 2.50
11
0.00 0.23 1.12
11
0.00 0.08 0.27
318 0.00 1.30 35.78

Table 4.6: Computational results with ai ∈ U (1, 99), bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 49)

n

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
23
0.00 0.17 2.84
22
0.00 0.11 1.67
24
0.00 0.00 0.07
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
23
0.00 0.03 0.38
23
0.00 0.03 0.56
23
0.00 0.01 0.12
23
0.00 0.03 0.55
22
0.00 0.03 0.64
21
0.00 0.01 0.14
23
0.00 0.01 0.14
23
0.00 0.01 0.12
24
0.00 0.00 0.06
22
0.00 0.02 0.22
22
0.00 0.01 0.25
20
0.00 0.02 0.16
23
0.00 0.00 0.10
24
0.00 0.00 0.02
22
0.00 0.01 0.14
22
0.00 0.00 0.04
24
0.00 0.00 0.04
17
0.00 0.01 0.09
21
0.00 0.00 0.02
21
0.00 0.01 0.13
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
20
0.00 0.01 0.06
22
0.00 0.01 0.11
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
23
0.00 0.00 0.03
674 0.00 0.02 2.84
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Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
11
0.00 11.64 35.96
10
0.00 4.51 29.35
15
0.00 1.06 8.55
9
0.00 4.03 21.88
12
0.00 1.75 8.24
9
0.00 0.85 3.08
12
0.00 1.93 12.11
9
0.00 0.90 3.37
13
0.00 0.41 2.13
10
0.00 1.89 7.36
7
0.00 0.71 2.76
7
0.00 0.65 2.42
13
0.00 1.18 6.75
9
0.00 0.60 2.35
11
0.00 0.55 3.21
7
0.00 1.01 4.20
7
0.00 0.48 1.50
13
0.00 0.32 1.91
12
0.00 0.47 2.79
10
0.00 0.42 1.24
12
0.00 0.50 2.54
8
0.00 0.88 2.28
11
0.00 0.23 1.45
11
0.00 0.18 1.11
6
0.00 0.97 2.98
17
0.00 0.11 0.71
12
0.00 0.11 0.35
12
0.00 0.71 2.52
11
0.00 0.24 1.20
11
0.00 0.09 0.36
317 0.00 1.31 35.96

of the number of optimal solutions found or the minimum, average, and maximum
APRD value. In fact, in majority of the cases, the total number of optimal solutions
found by Algorithm P exceeds those found by Algorithm T by a wide margin of
at least about 70%. As shown in Table 4.7, on average, Algorithm P generates
optimal solutions in 79% of cases as compared to 41% for Algorithm T. Further,
for each size and category of problem instances, the average APRD value found by
Algorithm P is well below 1% and is always less than that found by Algorithm T.
The overall APRD value of Algorithm P is 0.14 as compared to 1.37 for Algorithm
T. The overall maximum percent deviation of Algorithm P is 23.03 as compared to
64.26 for Algorithm T.
The effectiveness of the proposed heuristic Algorithm P does not significantly
change with the change in the range of the effectiveness rate βi and/or the tightness of
the total time available for investigations represented by α. However, these problem
parameters do significantly affect the performance of Algorithm T. However, reducing
the range of the minimum and maximum time required to investigate an evidence, ai
and bi does affect the performance of both algorithms. Further, as the total number of
evidence increases, the average and the maximum APRD decrease for each algorithm.
Thus, the really hard instances to optimally solve appear to be those for which the
minimum and maximum investigation times are drawn from a relatively small range
of values.
The computational results in Tables 4.1 through 4.7 show that the proposed
Algorithm P is relatively more effective in solving the sequential digital evidence
selection problem with a single investigator than Algorithm T, which could be con99

Table 4.7: Overall computational results

n

α

10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Overall

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

Heuristic Algorithm P
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
394 0.00 0.39 23.03
371 0.00 0.25 9.01
344 0.00 0.19 5.28
352 0.00 0.11 3.46
346 0.00 0.10 3.45
340 0.00 0.10 2.92
353 0.00 0.08 2.46
346 0.00 0.06 1.67
364 0.00 0.06 2.11
352 0.00 0.06 1.45
3562 0.00 0.14 23.03

Truncated Algorithm T
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
231 0.00 5.40 64.26
168 0.00 2.63 51.92
180 0.00 1.33 12.11
161 0.00 1.19 8.71
178 0.00 0.81 7.40
173 0.00 0.64 7.86
201 0.00 0.57 4.73
187 0.00 0.44 4.57
201 0.00 0.40 3.26
187 0.00 0.32 2.97
1867 0.00 1.37 64.26

sidered an adaptation of the fractional knapsack problem. Further, these results also
show that the proposed Algorithm P is quite effective in finding an optimal or a
near-optimal solution to the problem considered in Section 2.4.1.

4.2

Sequential Digital Forensic Problem with Multiple Investigators
We describe the computational experiments used to evaluate and compare

the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic Algorithm M in optimally solving the
proposed sequential digital forensic problem involving multiple investigators under
Section 2.5.4.

4.2.1

Parameters for Problem Instances
The experimental parameters remain the same from Section 4.1 except for the

total number of investigators I. The number of evidences in the experimental param-

100

eters for problem instances were 20, 30, 50 and 100 and the number of investigators
were 3, 4 and 5. Problem hardness is likely to depend on the values and ranges of the
parameters of the problem instance: the rate of the evidence effectiveness βi , the ratio
between the number of investigators I and the number of evidences E, the minimum
and maximum investigation times ai and bi , respectively, and the total time available
for investigation T . Therefore, we generated the following three classes of problem
instances by varying the ranges of problem parameters βi , ai and bi as follows.
• Class 1: βi , ai , and bi were generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99).
• Class 2: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99) and ai , bi were
generated from a uniform distribution U (50, 99).
• Class 3: βi was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99), ai was generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99) and bi was generated from a uniform
distribution U (50, 99).
We use the same values for α in order to test the impact of the total available
time in finding an optimal solution. For each combination of ai , bi , βi , e and i
values, 25 problem instances were generated, because they are sufficient to produce
steady state empirical results for the measures of performance of various algorithms.
Thus, our computational experiment consisted of solving a total of 2,700 (4*25*3*3*3)
problem instances.
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Table 4.8: Special problem instances with time restriction = 600 seconds

e
30
100
100
20
4.2.2

i
3
3
3
4

α
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3

CPLEX (Limit)
Solution Value CPU Time (s)
96873
600.016
379096
600.016
380759
600.032
76220
600.016

CPLEX (No Limit)
Optimal Value CPU Time (s)
96873
2631.204
379096
19993.781
380759
2561.328
76220
7858.171

Restriction of CPU Time for CPLEX Solution
In view of the NP-hard nature of the problem, it is likely that AIMMS may

require too much time to find optimal solutions to several problem instances. In order
to test this fact, we solved 225 problem instances for i = 3 with (1) ai , bi ∈ U (1, 99)
and βi ∈ U (1, 99), (2) ai , bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99), and (3) ai ∈ U (1, 99),
bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99) to optimality using AIMMS. In all these cases,
AIMMS was quite effective in finding an optimal solution in 10 minutes (600 seconds)
for all generated problem instances; however, for some problems it took almost 5.5
hours to prove the optimality of the derived solution. Table 4.8 shows four problem
instances where the computation time taken by AIMMS to prove that the generated
solutions were optimal was almost 334 minutes or 5.5 hours. For this reason, the
maximum CPU time limit of 600 seconds or 10 minutes was used to solve each problem
instance by AIMMS. The best solution generated within this time limit was accepted
as an optimal solution.
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4.2.3

Algorithm Effectiveness
To assess the effectiveness of the Algorithm M in relation to the optimal so-

lution, we solved each problem instance using the proposed heuristic Algorithm M.
To find the effectiveness of Algorithm M, we calculated the average percent relative
deviation, APRD defined as follows:
1 X
EA − EM
=
100 ∗
,
25 i=1
EA
25

AP RDM

(4.2)

where EM and EA are the total effectiveness values found by using heuristic Algorithm
M and AIMMS software, respectively. The smaller the value of AP RDM , the better
the performance of Algorithm M.
Tables 4.9 through 4.17 show the AP RDM values for the heuristic Algorithm
M and for each of the three categories of problem instances. These results are summarized in Table 4.18. The computational performance measures used in these tables
are defined as below:
• OPT = Total Number of Optimal Solutions of 25 instances
• % Deviation = 100.00*[Optimal solution - Heuristic solution] / [Optimal solution]
• Min = Minimum % Deviation of 25 instances
• Avg = Average % Deviation of 25 instances =
• Max = Maximum % Deviation of 25 instances
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P25

i=1

[% Deviation]/25

Table 4.9: Computational results for i = 3 with ai , bi ∈ U (1, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Effectiveness
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
2
0.00 1.97 12.85
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
24
0.00 0.01 0.23
0
0.05 0.62 2.77
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
1
0.00 0.18 0.53
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
0
0.00 0.06 0.19
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
202 0.00 0.24 12.85

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.03 0.44 4.20
0.03 0.03 0.05
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.09 0.56 1.45
0.03 0.05 0.03
0.03 0.04 0.05
0.13 0.69 2.50
0.05 0.06 0.08
0.05 0.05 0.06
0.09 0.41 1.19
0.03 0.05 0.05
0.03 0.05 0.06
0.00 0.20 4.20

We also used additional performance measures in seconds for the computation
time of optimal solution as defined below:
• Min = Minimum % Deviation of 25 instances for computational time of optimal
solution
• Avg = Average % Deviation of 25 instances =

P25

i=1

[% Deviation]/25 for com-

putational time of optimal solution
• Max = Maximum % Deviation of 25 instances for computational time of optimal
solution
These detailed and summary results show that the proposed Algorithm M is
quite effective in finding an optimal or near-optimal solution under all three categories
when measured in terms of the number of optimal solutions found or the minimum,
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Table 4.10: Computational results for i = 3 with ai , bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α

OPT

0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

0
22
25
0
25
25
0
25
25
0
25
25
197

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.07 2.31 6.48
0.00 0.13 1.73
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 1.25 3.67
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.57 1.66
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.01 2.58 0.33
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.57 6.48

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg
Max
0.03 15.93 154.97
0.00 0.04
0.39
0.00 0.01
0.04
0.03 24.53 600.02
0.02 0.02
0.03
0.02 0.02
0.02
0.06 0.58
1.25
0.02 0.02
0.03
0.02 0.02
0.02
0.13 49.29 600.03
0.03 0.04
0.05
0.03 0.05
0.05
0.00 7.57 600.03

Table 4.11: Computational results for i = 3 with ai ∈ U (1, 99), bi ∈ U (50, 99) and
βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Effectiveness
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0
0.08 1.76 9.94
21
0.00 0.61 12.02
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
0
0.03 0.52 1.97
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
2
0.00 1.20 0.22
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
2
0.00 0.09 0.31
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
200 0.00 0.35 9.94
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AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.11 0.92 11.03
0.00 0.02 0.06
0.00 0.02 0.03
0.06 0.52 1.00
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.01 0.02 0.03
0.06 0.40 0.89
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.03
0.09 0.35 0.99
0.03 0.05 0.06
0.05 0.05 0.05
0.00 2.42 11.03

Table 4.12: Computational results for i = 4 with ai , bi ∈ U (1, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
3
0.00 3.07 14.27
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
0
0.05 0.62 2.77
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
253 0.00 0.31 14.27

OPT

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg
Max
0.03 11.57 281.50
0.02 0.02
0.03
0.00 0.01
0.02
0.09 0.56
1.45
0.03 0.05
0.03
0.03 0.04
0.05
0.03 0.04
0.05
0.03 0.03
0.03
0.05 0.03
0.04
0.06 0.07
0.08
0.05 0.06
0.06
0.05 0.06
0.09
0.00 1.04 281.50

Table 4.13: Computational results for i = 4 with ai , bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Effectiveness
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
6
0.00 1.07 3.88
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
3
0.00 1.82 10.02
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
20
0.00 0.04 0.83
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
16
0.00 0.06 1.05
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
245 0.00 0.25 10.02

106

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg
Max
0.02 25.20 600.02
0.00 0.01
0.02
0.02 0.02
0.03
0.02 0.11
1.25
0.02 0.02
0.03
0.02 0.02
0.04
0.03 0.13
2.05
0.03 0.03
0.05
0.02 0.03
0.03
0.05 0.99
9.25
0.05 0.06
0.06
0.03 0.02
0.04
0.00 2.22 600.02

Table 4.14: Computational results for i = 4 with ai ∈ U (1, 99), bi ∈ U (50, 99) and
βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α

OPT

0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

4
25
25
9
25
25
18
25
25
23
25
25
254

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 1.56 9.62
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.74 5.52
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.30 2.42
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.02 0.40
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.22 9.62

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.02 1.35 8.23
0.00 0.02 0.03
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.02 0.58 3.72
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.01 0.03
0.03 0.25 5.42
0.03 0.03 0.03
0.00 0.02 0.01
0.06 0.07 0.08
0.05 0.04 0.06
0.05 0.05 0.06
0.00 0.20 8.23

Table 4.15: Computational results for i = 5 with ai , bi ∈ U (1, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α

OPT

0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

18
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
293

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.83 6.82
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.07 6.82
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AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.02 0.13 2.73
0.02 0.03 0.02
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.05
0.02 0.01 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.02
0.03 0.04 0.06
0.03 0.04 0.05
0.03 0.04 0.05
0.06 0.08 0.11
0.06 0.07 0.08
0.06 0.07 0.08
0.02 0.05 2.73

Table 4.16: Computational results for i = 5 with ai , bi ∈ U (50, 99) and βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α

OPT

0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

17
25
25
18
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
285

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.58 5.09
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.24 2.88
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.07 5.09

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.02 3.84 88.73
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.01 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.04 0.08
0.03 0.04 0.05
0.03 0.04 0.05
0.08 0.09 0.09
0.06 0.07 0.08
0.06 0.07 0.08
0.01 0.39 88.73

Table 4.17: Computational results for i = 5 with ai ∈ U (1, 99), bi ∈ U (50, 99) and
βi ∈ U (1, 99)

e

20

30

50

100
Overall

α
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.9
-

Effectiveness
OPT
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
16
0.00 0.94 11.88
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
21
0.00 0.59 6.97
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
25
0.00 0.00 0.00
287 0.00 0.13 11.88
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AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.02 0.02 0.06
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.09
0.02 0.03 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.03
0.03 0.04 0.05
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.03 0.03 0.05
0.08 0.08 0.09
0.05 0.06 0.06
0.05 0.06 0.06
0.02 0.04 0.09

Table 4.18: Overall computational results

e

α

OPT

20
30
50
100
Overall

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

508
526
589
591
2214

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 2.85 14.27
0.00 0.23 10.02
0.00 0.09 3.67
0.00 0.10 2.55
0.00 0.82 14.27

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.00 2.21 600.02
0.01 1.02 600.02
0.02 0.10 2.50
0.03 1.94 600.03
0.00 1.32 600.03

average, and maximum APRD value. In fact, in majority of the cases, the percentage
of total number of optimal solutions found by Algorithm M to those found by AIMMS
was within a margin of at least about 66%. As shown in Table 4.18, on average,
Algorithm M generates optimal solutions in 82% of the cases. Further, for each size
and category of problem instances, the average APRD value found by Algorithm M
is well below 1.0%. The overall APRD value of Algorithm M is 0.82. The overall
maximum percent deviation of Algorithm M is 14.27.
The effectiveness of the proposed heuristic Algorithm M significantly changes
with the change in the range of the the tightness of the total time available for investigations represented by α and the total number of available investigators I. However,
reducing the range of the minimum and maximum time required to investigate an
evidence, ai and bi does not affect the performance of Algorithm M. Further, as the
total number of investigators increases, the average and the maximum APRD decrease for Algorithm M. Thus, the really hard instances to optimally solve appear
to be those for which the ratio of the total number of evidences to investigators is
high, the value of α is relatively small and the minimum and maximum investigation
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times are drawn from a relatively small range of values. The computational results
in Tables 4.9 through 4.17 show that the proposed Algorithm M is quite effective in
solving the sequential digital forensic problem with multiple investigators considered
in Section 2.5.4.
As shown in Table 4.18, the average APRD value for the computation time of
optimal solution is 1.32 seconds as compared to 0.00 seconds for heuristic Algorithm
M. Also, the maximum value for the computation time of optimal solution is 600.03
seconds versus 0.01 seconds for heuristic Algorithm M. The CPU time required to
solve any problem instance by Algorithm M was less than 1.00 second. However, as
shown in Tables 4.9 through 4.18, CPU time required by AIMMS was much larger
than 1.00 second. Thus, these results show that the proposed Algorithm M is quite
efficient in finding an optimal or a near-optimal solution to the general problem.

4.3

Passive IDS Alarm Investigation Problem with Limited Resources
We describe the computational experiments used to evaluate and compare the

effectiveness of the proposed greedy based heuristic Algorithm G in optimally solving
the proposed passive IDS alarm investigation problem under Section 3.3.3.

4.3.1

Parameters for Problem Instances
The experimental parameters were the number of alarms N , loss in value vi

for each alarm i ∈ N , time taken to investigate an alarm ti for each alarm i ∈ N , Ki ,
wi for each alarm i ∈ N , and the total available investigation time, T . The number of
alarms in the experimental parameters for problem instances varied from 10 through
110

100 in increments of 10. Problem hardness is likely to depend on the values and ranges
of all parameters of the problem instances. Therefore, we generated the following two
classes of problem instances by varying the ranges of problem parameters vi , ti , Ki
and wi as follows.
• Class 1: ti , Ki and wi were generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 99) and
vi was generated from a uniform distribution U (800, 1400).
• Class 2: ti , Ki and wi were generated from a uniform distribution U (1, 49) and
vi was generated from a uniform distribution U (300, 700).
In order to test the impact of the total available time in finding an optimal
solution, we set T = α

Pn

i=1 bi

where α = 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. For each combination of

ti , vi , Ki and wi and i values, 25 problem instances were generated, because they are
sufficient to produce steady state empirical results for the measures of performance of
various algorithms. Thus, our computational experiment consisted of solving a total
of 1,500 (2*25*3*10) problem instances.

4.3.2

Algorithm Effectiveness
To assess the effectiveness of the Algorithm G in relation to the optimal solu-

tion, we solved each problem instance using the proposed greedy heuristic Algorithm
G. To find the effectiveness of Algorithm G, we calculated the average percent relative
deviation, APRD defined as follows:
1 X
EA − EG
100 ∗
,
25 i=1
EA
25

AP RDG =
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(4.3)

where EG and EA are the total effectiveness values found by using heuristic Algorithm
G and AIMMS software, respectively. The smaller the value of AP RDG , the better
the performance of Algorithm H.
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show the AP RDG values for the heuristic Algorithm G
and for each of the two categories of problem instances. These results are summarized
in Table 4.21. The computational performance measures used in these tables are
defined as below:
• % Deviation = 100.00*[Optimal solution - Heuristic solution] / [Optimal solution]
• Min = Minimum % Deviation of 25 instances
• Avg = Average % Deviation of 25 instances =

P25

i=1

[% Deviation]/25

• Max = Maximum % Deviation of 25 instances
We also used additional performance measures in seconds for the computation
time of optimal solution as defined below:
• Min = Minimum % Deviation of 25 instances for computational time of optimal
solution
• Avg = Average % Deviation of 25 instances =

P25

i=1

[% Deviation]/25 for com-

putational time of optimal solution
• Max = Maximum % Deviation of 25 instances for computational time of optimal
solution
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Table 4.19: Computational results with ti , wi , Ki ∈ U (1, 99) and vi ∈ U (800, 1400)

i

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
-

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.47 3.80
0.00 0.78 3.75
0.00 0.76 3.75
0.00 1.20 3.54
0.00 0.77 3.54
0.00 0.61 2.44
0.00 0.83 3.27
0.00 0.57 3.66
0.00 0.54 2.57
0.00 1.10 3.04
0.00 0.86 2.60
0.00 0.95 2.08
0.00 0.89 2.01
0.00 1.10 3.32
0.00 0.95 1.93
0.00 0.76 2.00
0.00 0.78 1.83
0.00 1.00 3.07
0.00 1.10 2.57
0.22 1.09 2.69
0.29 1.10 2.25
0.10 1.02 2.21
0.15 1.05 2.06
0.19 0.97 2.21
0.09 1.03 2.43
0.39 1.14 2.43
0.23 1.09 2.67
0.00 0.96 2.24
0.08 1.13 2.24
0.14 1.10 2.24
0.00 0.92 3.80
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AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.00 0.01 0.04
0.00 0.01 0.03
0.00 0.01 0.03
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.01 0.02
0.02 0.03 0.05
0.02 0.02 0.05
0.02 0.03 0.05
0.03 0.05 0.08
0.03 0.06 0.14
0.00 0.06 0.09
0.05 0.08 0.28
0.03 0.09 0.31
0.05 0.10 0.23
0.08 0.16 0.33
0.06 0.18 0.36
0.06 0.21 0.69
0.09 0.26 1.17
0.08 0.44 1.16
0.11 0.42 1.02
0.13 0.61 1.48
0.13 0.56 1.38
0.20 0.75 1.58
0.20 0.82 1.70
0.24 1.00 1.78
0.20 0.93 1.34
0.00 0.23 1.70

Table 4.20: Computational results with ti , wi , Ki ∈ U (1, 49) and vi ∈ U (300, 700)

i

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Overall

α
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
0.9
-

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 1.02 8.48
0.00 0.89 5.07
0.00 1.37 11.14
0.00 1.47 4.88
0.00 1.13 4.96
0.00 0.61 2.44
0.00 1.64 3.91
0.16 1.66 4.11
0.00 1.62 5.94
0.00 1.63 3.62
0.00 1.61 3.43
0.00 1.58 5.07
0.62 1.90 4.53
0.41 1.59 3.89
0.00 1.89 4.53
0.24 1.51 3.17
0.29 1.38 2.90
0.48 1.59 3.83
0.25 1.58 4.49
0.77 1.87 2.88
0.70 1.72 2.88
0.22 1.36 2.42
0.50 1.58 2.84
0.60 1.58 3.31
0.50 1.40 2.12
0.39 1.35 2.47
0.38 1.58 2.69
0.30 1.31 2.61
0.21 1.49 2.50
0.46 1.47 2.98
0.00 1.48 11.14
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AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.00 0.02 0.02
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.00 0.02 0.03
0.00 0.02 0.03
0.00 0.01 0.02
0.00 0.02 0.06
0.02 0.03 0.05
0.02 0.03 0.05
0.02 0.05 0.11
0.03 0.05 0.13
0.03 0.05 0.14
0.05 0.13 0.39
0.03 0.10 0.20
0.05 0.15 0.36
0.08 0.29 0.88
0.09 0.31 0.70
0.06 0.26 0.64
0.11 0.33 0.88
0.20 0.70 1.06
0.27 0.65 1.03
0.22 1.22 0.65
0.25 0.99 2.67
0.33 0.86 1.97
0.41 1.28 3.17
0.41 1.24 2.69
0.27 1.06 2.42
0.95 1.46 2.78
0.91 2.06 11.30
0.92 2.22 10.80
0.00 0.52 11.30

Table 4.21: Overall computational results

i

α

10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Overall

0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7

Effectiveness
% Deviation
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.88 11.14
0.00 0.97 4.96
0.00 1.14 5.94
0.00 1.29 5.07
0.00 1.39 4.53
0.00 1.17 3.83
0.00 1.41 4.49
0.10 1.26 3.31
0.09 1.27 2.69
0.00 1.24 2.98
0.00 1.20 11.14

AIMMS CPU time
in seconds
Min Avg Max
0.00 0.01 0.04
0.00 0.01 0.03
0.00 0.02 0.06
0.02 0.04 0.14
0.00 0.15 0.39
0.03 0.19 0.88
0.06 0.19 0.88
0.08 0.70 2.67
0.13 0.26 3.17
0.20 1.42 11.30
0.00 1.42 11.30

These detailed and summary results show that the proposed Algorithm G is
quite effective in finding an optimal or near-optimal solution under all three categories
when measured in terms of the number of optimal solutions found or the minimum,
average, and maximum APRD value. For each size and category of problem instances,
the average APRD value found by Algorithm G is well below 1.5%. The overall APRD
value of Algorithm G is 1.20. The overall maximum percent deviation of Algorithm
G is 11.14.
The effectiveness of the proposed heuristic Algorithm G significantly changes
with the change in the range of the tightness of the total time available for investigations represented by α and the parameters ti , vi , Ki and wi . Further, the computational time increases with increase in the total number of alarms N , available
for investigation. Further, as the total number of alarms increases, the average and
the maximum APRD increase for Algorithm G. The computational results in Tables
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4.19 through 4.21 show that the proposed Algorithm G is quite effective in solving
the passive IDS alarm investigation problem Z. Further, these results also show that
the proposed Algorithm G is quite effective in finding an optimal or a near-optimal
solution to the proposed general problem.
As shown in Table 4.21, the average APRD value for the computation time of
optimal solution is 1.42 seconds as compared to 0.00 seconds for heuristic Algorithm
G. Also, the maximum value for the computation time of optimal solution is 11.30
seconds versus 0.10 seconds for heuristic Algorithm G. The CPU time required to
solve any problem instance by Algorithm G was less than 0.10 second. However, as
shown in Tables 4.19 through 4.21, CPU time required by AIMMS was much larger
than 1.00 second. These results show that the proposed Algorithm G is quite efficient
in finding an optimal or a near-optimal solution to the general problem.

4.4

Conclusion
This chapter presented the design of extensive computational experiments to

ascertain the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithms in Chapters 2 and 3 in
finding an optimal or near-optimal solution to the general problems. By generating
computational experiments randomly based on various uniform distributions of data,
we also showed that the real-time problems are easier to solve than the simulated
ones. The next chapter presents a summary of findings with promising opportunities
and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to say what is impossible, for
the dream of yesterday is the hope of today
and the reality of tomorrow.
—Robert H. Goddard
5.1

Summary
Cyber crime has become a primary concern across the globe, impacting every

sector of society and causing serious financial loss and breaches in information security. One of the main reasons for the rapid proliferation of cyber crime is an increasing
human dependence on the Internet. The existing security models are minimally effective in protecting against cyber attacks and crimes. Thus, this dissertation proposes
research models for investigating digital crime and computer/network intrusion.
The first problem addressed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation deals with crime
scene investigation (CSI) as it relates to digital forensics. Problems associated with
digital CSI are becoming a major concern because of the growth in the incidences of
these crimes and the complex nature of their investigations. The amount of evidence
found in a digital crime scene has increased significantly over the past few years.
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Further, the demand for delivering accurate results within a given time frame has
also increased, as has the backlog of digital investigations.
Primarily, in the absence of any significant analytical models and, for the first
time in the related literature, we present a mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
model to analyze the problem of allocating optimal investigation times for evidence,
thereby maximizing the overall effectiveness of a forensic investigation procedure. Second, we classify and describe sequential and parallel procedures for examining digital
evidence acquired from a crime scene. Third, while the sequential digital forensic
problem with single investigator is NP-hard, two special cases are illustrated to be
polynomially solvable. Two heuristic algorithms that require O(n) computational
effort for the sequential digital forensic problem involving single investigator and one
heuristic algorithm that requires O(n.m) computational effort for the sequential digital forensic problem involving multiple investigators are proposed to solve the general
problem P and M respectively. Extensive computational experiments are presented
in Chapter 4 to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithms in order to find an optimal or near-optimal solution. Results of the empirical
experiments strongly validate that the heuristic algorithms T, P and M are quite
effective in finding an optimal or approximately optimal solution to the general problem.
The second problem addressed in Chapter 3 deals with the investigation of
alarms generated by a passive Intrusion Detection System (IDS). An IDS is one of
the tools available to network managers and refers to both software and hardware
systems that are designed and programmed to automate the process of monitoring
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networks and analyzing them for potential breaches. Securing and defending computing networks has become a matter of growing importance attracting the attention of
both practitioners and researchers. Research is ongoing to improve the effectiveness
of an IDS in terms of selecting the minimal number of false positives to investigate.
Additional parameters that must be taken into account under this dimension are the
cost incurred by a firm in investigating the selected alarms and the time taken by an
IDS for the entire investigation.
In this dissertation, we address the aforementioned issues and challenges by
modeling the passive IDS alarm investigation problem. The main solution of our
model is to effectively assist network managers in optimally allocating available and
limited resources for investigating IDS notifications (alarms). The problem of selecting which IDS alarms to investigate in order to minimize the total cost of investigations and the loss in value for non-investigation is considered. The proposed MILP
model focuses on helping a single network administrator to make an optimal decision in choosing which alarms need to be investigated and in what sequence they
should be investigated. Further, in view of the NP-hard nature of the passive IDS
alarm investigation problem, a greedy heuristic algorithm is proposed to solve the
general problem Z. Extensive computational experiments are presented in Chapter 4
to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed greedy heuristic Algorithm
G to find an optimal or near-optimal solution. Results of the empirical experiments
strongly validate that the heuristic Algorithm G is quite effective in finding an optimal
or approximately optimal solution to the general problem.
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While problems P, M and Z are NP-hard, we define various performance metrics to ascertain the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed heuristic algorithms.
Further, it would be ideal to test the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithms
using real-time data but unfortunately, our search for obtaining them was unsuccessful. In view of this, our computational experiments were generated randomly using
various uniform distributions of data.

5.2

Future Areas of Research
Several issues are worthy of future investigations and include the following

topics.

5.2.1

Digital Forensic Crime Scene Investigation Model
While we limited the discussion in this dissertation to the digital forensic

investigation of computer-related crimes, our proposed methodology is applicable to
several other crime scene investigations as well. For example, in the case of a physical
theft in a house, evidence collected at the crime scene is taken to the laboratory.
Further, the proposed approach can be used to solve forensic investigation problems
in more complex, machine-based environments. In addition, the proposed approach
can be augmented with local search heuristics if further improvements in the results
are needed. Our proposed algorithms are equally applicable to solve such problems,
provided the assumptions made in this paper are valid.
First, the proposed heuristic Algorithm P can be improved by considering
more than one piece of evidence after Steps 1 and 2 fail to find a feasible solution.
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Second, finding the worst-case performance bounds of the proposed heuristic algorithms will be useful. Third, from a practical viewpoint, it will be interesting and
useful to conduct empirical and theoretical studies to develop appropriate measures
and methodologies to determine the effectiveness function of various pieces of evidence (which depend on the specific crime scene that is being investigated), to be
used to develop appropriate and specific models for digital crime scene investigations.
Fourth, considering the non-linear effectiveness of evidence investigation times will
increase the practical application of optimization techniques to the field of digital
forensic investigations. Fifth, developing proof that illustrates Problems P and M
are NP-hard in the strong sense may be of significant importance. Finally, extending
our research to model and analyze the parallel digital forensic investigation problem,
involving simultaneous evidence collection and investigation will be useful, and is
important to solve problems found in practice.

5.2.2

Passive IDS Alarm Investigation Model
For the passive IDS alarm investigation model, based on our experimental

investigations, the proposed approach seems promising. However, more theoretical, computational and fieldwork is needed to verify these conclusions. Further, we
need to identify means with which to secure the parameter values, like cost and loss
functions, the probability of an alarm being false and the investigation time needed
for determining if the alarm is false. Our analysis can be extended to analyze the
alarm investigation problem involving multiple security administrators. The proposed
greedy Algorithm G can be improved (a) by considering the insertion and elimination
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of alarms falling later in the investigation queue that have shorter finish times and
lower cost factors and (b) by swapping alarms between the sets A (Selected Alarms)
and B (Rejected Alarms) using conditions based on finish times and a comparison of
cost factors with the loss in value of each alarm.
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A

AIMMS MODEL TREE, DATASET GENERATION AND PROGRAM
STRUCTURE

Dataset construction for sequential digital forensic problem with single
investigator.

!The user specified the parameters for the instance generation as follows:
!No. of Evidences: 10
!Investigation Time Deadline: 141
Evidences := DATA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ;
TotalTime := 141;
maximumtime(e) := DATA 1 : 98, 2 : 83, 3 : 55, 4 : 63, 5 : 97, 6 : 63, 7 : 91, 8 :
55, 9 : 97, 10 : 96 ;
minimumtime(e) := DATA 1 : 54, 2 : 63, 3 : 35, 4 : 30, 5 : 62, 6 : 26, 7 : 19, 8 : 42,
9 : 8, 10 : 18 ;
effectiveness(e) := DATA 1 : 48, 2 : 48, 3 : 41, 4 : 26, 5 : 14, 6 : 13, 7 : 9, 8 : 7, 9 :
3, 10 : 2 ;
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Dataset construction for sequential digital forensic problem with multiple
investigators.

!The user specified the parameters for the instance generation as follows:
!No. of Evidences: 10
!No. of Investigators: 3
!Investigation Time Deadline: 541
Evidences := DATA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ;
Investigators := DATA 1, 2, 3 ;
TotalTime := 541;
maximumtime(e) := DATA 1 : 98, 2 : 83, 3 : 57, 4 : 71, 5 : 70, 6 : 63, 7 : 96, 8 :
81, 9 : 97, 10 : 96 ;
minimumtime(e) := DATA 1 : 93, 2 : 60, 3 : 35, 4 : 30, 5 : 62, 6 : 56, 7 : 19, 8 : 55,
9 : 84, 10 : 70 ;
effectiveness(e) := DATA 1 : 96, 2 : 95, 3 : 94, 4 : 76, 5 : 68, 6 : 52, 7 : 17, 8 : 12,
9 : 6, 10 : 3 ;
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Dataset construction for passive IDS alarm investigation problem.

!The user specified the parameters for the instance generation as follows:
!No. of Alarms: 10
!Investigation Time Deadline: 241
Alarms := DATA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ;
TotalTime := 241;
w(i) := DATA 1 : 96, 2 : 65, 3 : 97, 4 : 52, 5 : 83, 6 : 63, 7 : 55, 8 : 54, 9 : 12, 10 :
8;
t(i) := DATA 1 : 3, 2 : 8, 3 : 62, 4 : 42, 5 : 94, 6 : 76, 7 : 88, 8 : 98, 9 : 63, 10 : 97 ;
v(i) := DATA 1 : 826, 2 : 894, 3 : 1291, 4 : 953, 5 : 1458, 6 : 1336, 7 : 1112, 8 :
1400, 9 : 945, 10 : 1316 ;
K(i) := DATA 1 : 21, 2 : 93, 3 : 26, 4 : 95, 5 : 35, 6 : 19, 7 : 27, 8 : 63, 9 : 17, 10 :
18 ;
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Figure A.1: Model tree for sequential digital forensic problem with single investigator.
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Figure A.2: Model tree for sequential digital forensic problem with multiple investigators.
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Figure A.3: Model tree for passive IDS alarm investigation problem.
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130
Figure A.4: Program code for converting input data into problem instances.
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Figure A.5: Program code for solving problems in a batch.
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Figure A.6: Setup of maximum time and iteration limits.

Figure A.7: Data manager for running datasets in a single execution.
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